Using Payment by Results to Improve the Sustainability of Rural Water Supply Services in Tanzania

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Lessons learned from the FCDO - funded programme in Tanzania (covering Phases Five and Six, and summative reflections across the programme)

February 2022

Contents

Disclaimer

Acknowledgements

Programme Information

Name of the Programme	Support to Rural Water Supply, Sanitation and Hygiene in Tanzania
Project Value	GPB 59.25 million disbursed under the Payment by Results scheme.
Funder	FCDO Tanzania
Duration	2014-2022
Implementer	Government of Tanzania through the Ministry of Water and RUWASA
FCDO Senior Responsible Officer	Lukas Kwezi

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Acronyms

CBSP	Capacity Building Service Provider
CBWSO	Community-Based Water Supply Organisation
CDMT	Central Data Management Team
CMO	Community Management Organisation
CSO	Civil Society Organisation
DFID	Department for International Development
DIME	Development Impact Evaluation
DM	District Manager
DVSP	Data Verification Service Provider
FCDO	Foreign, Commonwealth & Development Office
FGD	Focus Group Discussion
GoT	Government of Tanzania
LGA	Local Government Authority
MEL	Monitoring, Evaluation and Learning
MoW	Ministry of Water
PbR	Payment by Results (FCDO supported project)
PFM	Public Financial Management
PforR	Payment for Results (World Bank supported project)
QA	Quality Assurance
RM	Regional Manager
RSDMS	Rural Service Delivery Management System
RUWASA	Rural Water Supply and Sanitation Agency
RWIMS	Rural WASH Information Management System
SWAp	Sector-Wide Approach to planning
VfM	Value for Money
WASH	Water, Sanitation and Hygiene
WSDP	Water Sector Development Plan

Executive Summary

Background

In 2014 the UK government's Department for International Development (DFID, now the Foreign, Commonwealth and Development Office – FCDO) launched its 'Support to Rural Water Supply, Sanitation & Hygiene in Tanzania' programme.

At the time of programme design, the rural water supply sub-sector in Tanzania was characterised by an overwhelming focus on new infrastructure development by government, with limited attention and budget allocation to post-construction follow-up and support to community water supply service providers. Despite the USD 1.6 billion committed by multiple development partners under Phase I of the Water Supply and Sanitation Programme (WSDP I launched in 2007), by 2014 there were still relatively high rates of non-functionality of rural water supply infrastructure, and growing concerns about the effectiveness of the WSDP Phase I to increase access for rural water supply services (Carlitz, 2016).

In response, FCDO included in the programme GBP 54.1 million to support the delivery of water infrastructure through the basket fund of WSDP II and GBP 59.25 million disbursed to the Payment by Results component (PbR). This report focusses on the PbR component, which sought to increase the focus and commitment of government towards supporting the sustainability of rural water supply services, by providing results-based financing for the ongoing functionality of rural water points. The PbR component of the programme was highly innovative in its use of results-based funding to increase sustainability (rather than new access) of Water, Sanitation and Hygiene (WASH) services, and it was also FCDO's first WASH program to deliver PbR via government.

Those who are less familiar with the programme can find further information in the [first learning report](#).

Purpose of the report

This report provides an overview of the diverse lessons from a highly innovative, FCDO-funded, PbR programme, aiming to improve rural water supply sustainability in Tanzania. The learning points have been compiled by the Learning Team of the Data Verification Service Provider (DVSP), written primarily by Will Tillett (Aguaconsult), on behalf of FCDO, the Government of Tanzania (GoT), and the programme Service Providers[1].

This is the third and final programme-wide learning report focussing on the final two years of the programme (covering payment and verification Phases Five and Six), together with broader summative learning as a whole, and reflections around the programme's exit strategy.[2] Furthermore, there is a section on 'if you were to design this programme again'. It also includes recommendations for the main stakeholders, to consider for the final months of the programme, and for post-programme actions. Lessons generated from this programme are primarily aimed at GoT and FCDO stakeholders in Tanzania but will also be relevant to a broader set of actors working in the water sector, with an interest in results-based funding, and sustainability of rural water supply services.

Main findings

The report captures findings across eight learning themes based on a process of review of documentation and semi-structured interviews with stakeholders both directly working on the programme as well as those external to it.

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[1] DIME and the DVSP consortium led by Ecorys and including WEMA Consult, IWEL, Aguaconsult and DataVision International.

[2] 2014-2019 Programme-wide Learning Report can be found here: https://www.ecorys.com/sites/default/files/2020-10/DfID%20PbR%20rural%20water%202019%20Learning%20Report_Final_0.pdf

2020 Programme-wide Learning Report can be found here: https://www.ecorys.com/sites/default/files/2020-12/FCDO%20Tz%20PbR%20Phase%204%20Learning%20Report_Final.pdf

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| 1. Design and management of the programme | 2. Using PbR to stimulate change in the system | 3. Monitoring systems, and verification of results | 4. Eligibility, incentives, disbursements and fund usage | 5. Achieving outcomes (improved sustainability) | 6. Equity and Value for Money (VfM) | 7. Exit strategy | 8. If you were to design this again? |

Figure 1 The eight learning themes

Design and management of the PbR programme (Section 4.1)

Customised and strong internal and external communication, coordination and governance helps to maximise effectiveness through increasing ownership, trust and impact of verification on planning and decision making. This is particularly relevant where a programme has multiple service providers and stakeholders. Furthermore, sector harmonisation reinforces programme effectiveness and is particularly important within a programme seeking to influence, incentivise and use leverage to increase the government focus on a particular issue (in this case functionality of rural water points).

Risk and adaptive management are important considerations for PbR programmes such as this. Whilst results-based payments transfer much of the risk to those delivering the results, risks still remain to the programme funders such as disbursement amounts and validity of reported results. Adaptive management is also key in a pioneering programme such as this, so as to manage risk and to provide 'space' for elements of 'learning by doing'. This in turn presents its own set of risks such as confusion and/or mis-interpretation, which can to an extent be mitigated through up-front research and effective communication.

Using PbR to stimulate change in the system (Section 4.2)

With PbR's need for reliable data, data and verification can be potential vehicles of change but they require specific and sustained efforts to maximise the potential impact on systemic change. The funds of a PbR programme can be used for leverage to encourage government to strengthen their monitoring systems and data, whilst verification can highlight data accuracy issues which need to be acted on. That said, risks, as previously mentioned, do also exist, for example, leverage can be threatened by both expectations and pressures to disburse.

Accountability, recognition and motivation are also important drivers of change including processes that benchmark and rank the performance of districts and regions against each other. However, where there may be incentives of stakeholders to maximise disbursements and demonstrate and communicate positive programme impact, it is important to commend progress whilst maintaining focus on any ongoing persistent and problematic issues.

Another set of findings centres on defining the route or destination of the systems change process, in this case the route being delivery of PbR through government. Delivering through government can facilitate scaling but it takes time. There is also an important need to understand the compatibility between Public Financial Management (PFM) norms and a flexible approach to achieve PbR outputs and outcomes. Recognition is also to be given to the situation that no system is static and that it is impossible to predict the impact of new developments. It is also important to understand that there is no guarantee that a positive systemic change will necessarily be sustained over time and to be aware of the reasons behind this. For example, other sector programme requirements, and/or changes in policy or practice that may influence dynamics in the system - one clear example of this during the lifetime of the programme was the establishment of the Rural Water Supply and Sanitation Agency (RUWASA).

Monitoring systems, and verification of results (Section 4.3)

Various elements of monitoring and verification (for example having a clear dataset) can be themselves key enablers of change, and sequencing of such elements is important. This is particularly pertinent when verifying functionality, given its complexity. One critical need is that the definitions and means of measurement between reported and verified data are harmonised and understood by all relevant stakeholders involved in the data chain, especially those at the lowest point.

Verification methodologies also need to be resilient, for example due to limited field access resulting from the COVID-19 pandemic. Learning from phone-based surveys provides an alternative approach although there may be trade-offs with reliability and credibility of the results.

Eligibility, incentives, disbursements and fund usage (Section 4.4)

The incentive and payment structure for PbR needs to be transparent and well communicated to all levels of stakeholders, noting that the payment formula can incentivise actions in different ways, which may be appropriate at different stages of the programme. The communication of results also needs to be clear and helps facilitate performance ranking. For example, in-person workshops with District Managers (DMs), together with tailored district-by-district 'Atlases of Results' helped stakeholders understand and engage with data and verification findings.

Understanding absorption capacities, particularly in contexts where multiple programmes or funding conduits are channelling funds to particular recipients, is also important. Interlinked to this is that facilitating district strategic planning processes could help make annual planning and decisions on how best to use PbR funds more strategic and accountable. Furthermore, having clear institutional guidelines on how funds should be spent at the district level and clear centrally approved district annual plans helps to facilitate the auditability of fund usage, but may restrict district stakeholders' ability to channel fund use to what they see as most needed to achieve results.

Achieving outcomes (improved sustainability) (Section 4.5)

In terms of setting goals and defining pathways to achieve goals, it is important to understand that 'functionality' does not equate with sustainability and focuses more on infrastructure than services; historically the sector has tended to use functionality as a proxy for sustainability, although this is changing. Identifying barriers to sustainability from the outset, for example by defining root causes behind low functionality rates and what is needed to address these, can be a useful initial investment (i.e. a form of sustainability diagnostic). Different water supply service delivery models may emerge over the course of the programme, which may be useful to identify and test as alternative routes (to community-based management) to achieve improved service outcomes. This also links back to the previous findings relating to the importance of flexibility and an adaptive approach to this type of results-based payment programme that can allow for new approaches and ideas that may emerge from (global) sector thinking and innovation to be incorporated.

It is also important to understand roles and responsibilities for achieving sustainability outcomes and reinforce these through who is paid for what. This is considered as a key decision at programme design phase in results-based-financing.

Equity and Value for Money (VfM) (Section 4.6)

Assessing the extent to which the programme achieved VfM or equity of outcomes goes beyond the scope of this report, however, some learning points have been identified. Defining the payment value to enable and incentivise delivery of results without paying more than is necessary (i.e. determining an optimal amount of payment), can be a challenge. Determining cost effectiveness is also challenging as it is influenced by programme design, and dependent on the availability and comparability of other initiatives that can be benchmarked against the programme both in terms of cost and performance.

Effective coordination to increase synergies between different programme service providers, and ensuring data generated in the programme is fully utilised were both flagged as enabling approaches to maximise the likelihood of VfM.

Achieving equity cannot be assumed if it is not specifically incentivised or monitored. Furthermore, by definition, PbR rewards the best performers, which in turn has implications on equity targeting of payments, particularly when done over a protracted period of years. Additional consideration may be needed as to how to improve progress among the poorest performers.

Exit strategy (Section 4.7)

When considering an exit strategy from this type of donor-funded initiative, it can be useful to place the programme within a longer-term sector trajectory and define how the programme would be institutionalised. Stakeholders across the programme raised concerns about the long-term continuity of

government allocated funding once the PbR programme had finished. However, others also felt that the PbR was about stimulating systemic change and therefore may not need to be continued as this change-process had already been stimulated.

Recommendations

The recommendations are grouped by stakeholder, however it is acknowledged that there may be shared responsibilities across stakeholders in undertaking of these actions.

FCDO	
1.	Continue to facilitate the transition of certain elements of the programme between PbR and PforR programmes (and other sector investments). Unpack the effective elements of the PbR programme and work with relevant stakeholders (in particular the PforR counterparts) to define how the elements could continue beyond the programme duration.
2.	Maximise the sharing of learning from the PbR programme within Tanzania and globally, including lessons such as the need to undertake research into foundational aspects of poor service sustainability prior to the design of a major PbR programme.
RUWASA, MoW, World Bank, and other sector financiers	
1.	Continue to strengthen monitoring systems, and appraisal of their contents. For example, cleaning the data sets or accelerating the roll out of physical marking of water points with their unique ID numbers.
2.	Whilst commending what is working well (for example, total amounts disbursed and absorbed), do not lose sight of what is not making such progress. There is a continued need to ensure adequate focus on the aspects of improving functionality of rural water supply services and data accuracy.
3.	Continue to reinforce the prioritisation and effective incentivisation of sustaining services over new construction.
4.	Ensure widespread clarity on roles and responsibilities for maintenance (between RUWASA and community service providers) and reinforce these in how future funds are used.
5.	Strengthen centralised and decentralised capacities of RUWASA for data analysis and usage, and share the data with the wider WASH sector to maximise the value of the data.
6.	Ensure RUWASA work with Local Government Authorities (LGAs) and civil society organisations (CSOs) to develop WASH plans to increase accountability and define the pathway to achieving and sustaining universal access to WASH services in the districts.
7.	Progressively evolve sector performance indicators and continue to test different service delivery models and approaches for monitoring to achieve sustainable service delivery.
8.	Undertake a Life Cycle Costs Analysis of the funds required to achieve sustained adequate levels of service delivery, as a way to ensure VfM is a primary driver for programming and decision-making.
9.	Assess and incentivise efforts towards increasing equity of service delivery.
10.	Engage with the wider Tanzanian WASH sector to define what a long-term vision and targets would be for sustainable rural water service delivery to help define the progressive exit or transition strategy for external funds (PbR and PforR programmes).

The full recommendations can be found in Section 5 of this report. Recommendations for the DVSP and the World Bank's Development Impact Evaluation (DIME) can be found in Annex 1. Further learning from this innovative programme will come from DIME's performance evaluation of the programme.

*Using Payment by Results to Improve the Sustainability
of Rural Water Supply Services in Tanzania*

1. Purpose and scope of this document

This report provides an overview of the diverse lessons from a highly innovative, Foreign, Commonwealth and Development Office (FCDO)-funded, Payment by Results (PbR) programme, aiming to improve rural water supply sustainability in Tanzania. The learning points have been compiled by the Learning Team of the Data Verification Service Provider (DVSP), written primarily by Will Tillett (Aguaconsult), on behalf of FCDO, the Government of Tanzania (GoT), and the programme Service Providers[3].

This is the third and final programme-wide learning report focussing on the final two years of the programme (covering payment and verification Phases Five and Six), together with broader summative learning as a whole, and reflections around the programme's exit strategy. It also includes recommendations for key stakeholders to consider for the final months of the programme, and for post-programme actions. The link to the 2019 Programme-wide Learning Report is available here[4], and the 2020 Programme-wide Learning Report is here[5]. An overview of the programme-wide learning cycle timings is provided in Figure 2 below.


Figure 2: An overview of the programme-wide learning cycle timings

This report is written primarily for the stakeholders and implementers of the PbR programme, and those implementing similar programmes within Tanzania. However, given the innovative nature of this initiative and the associated learning, it is likely to also be of interest to wider Water, Sanitation and Hygiene (WASH) sector stakeholders, in Tanzania and beyond, who have an interest in sustainable rural water supply service delivery, systems strengthening, adaptive management, and results-based funding mechanisms.

The learning points presented in this report have been identified through a process of interviews and Focus Group Discussions (FGDs) with national and global-level stakeholders[6], in-country consultation with sub-national stakeholders such as the Rural Water Supply and Sanitation Agency (RUWASA) staff and district-level WASH stakeholders[7], and a review of key programme documents developed during the review period. Draft findings were further enriched and triangulated through review of drafts of this report by different stakeholders.

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[3] DIME and the DVSP consortium led by Ecorys and including WEMA Consult, IWEL, Aguaconsult and DataVision International.

[4] 2014-2019 Programme-wide Learning Report can be found here: https://www.ecorys.com/sites/default/files/2020-10/DfID%20PbR%20rural%20water%202019%20Learning%20Report_Final_0.pdf

[5] 2020 Programme-wide Learning Report can be found here: https://www.ecorys.com/sites/default/files/2020-12/FCDO%20Tz%20PbR%20Phase%204%20Learning%20Report_Final.pdf

[6] A total of 22 national and global-level key stakeholders were interviewed, through 15 semi-structured interviews and four Focus Group Discussions, conducted via web-based calls, each lasting between 60-90 minutes. These interviews included representatives from FCDO, RUWASA, CDMT, DVSP, DIME, the World Bank, PEM Consult. See Annex 2 for details.

[7] Phone-based semi-structured interviews were held in Swahili with 6 District Managers and 5 Regional Managers of RUWASA, and 4 in-person Focus Group Discussions with district-level government and WASH stakeholders, CBWSOs and technicians, with a total of 46 participants. See Annex 1 for details of participants, and the basis of selecting the districts and RUWASA staff

The programme-wide learning process is relatively rapid and qualitative in nature and is complemented by the work of the World Bank's Development Impact Evaluation (DIME), who are undertaking a performance evaluation of FCDO's PbR programme. Further learning points will emerge in 2022 from the final year of DIME's work, and through the Programme Completion Review, which is planned to be completed in September 2022.

2. Background and introduction to the programme

Whilst a short introduction of the PbR programme is provided below, those less familiar with the programme can find further information in the first learning report.

At the time of programme design, the rural water supply sub-sector in Tanzania was characterised by an overwhelming focus on new infrastructure development by government, with limited attention and budget allocation to post-construction follow-up and support to the community water supply service providers. This period was also characterised by relatively high rates of non-functionality of rural water supply infrastructure. Despite the launch of the Water Sector Development Programme (WSDP) in 2007, and USD 1.6 billion committed to it from multiple partners, there were growing concerns about the effectiveness of the WSDP Phase I to increase access for rural water supply services (Carlitz 2016).

Against this backdrop the UK government's Department for International Development (DFID, now the FCDO) launched its '*Phase Two: Rural Water Supply & Sanitation Programme'* in 2014, including GBP 54.1 million disbursed through input fixed tranche to support the delivery of water infrastructure through the basket fund of the WSDP II, and GBP 59.25 million disbursed to the PbR component. This report focusses on the PbR component, which seeks to incentivise improved support to service providers to maintain and sustain services, particularly by local government (and now RUWASA since its establishment in 2019).

As this PbR approach was somewhat untested in the sector, as was effective means to improve sector sustainability at scale, adaptive management was a key design feature of the programme. Under the PbR scheme, FCDO pays a fixed amount annually for every water point within a Local Government Authority (LGA) that is functional as per the agreed definition. In Phases Three to Six the payment was GBP 300 per functional water point. Initially, the payments at the local level were made to LGAs, later to RUWASA. The calculation of the payments also considers accuracy of results reported by government[8], hence incentivising efforts to strengthen monitoring systems and address underlying sustainability issues. Payments are based on the independent verification of the Government's reporting by the DVSP, with reporting, verification and payment cycles undertaken annually.

The programme commenced in 2014, and initially faced challenges of poor government monitoring systems and data, which posed challenges for PbR given the importance of being able to report and prove results in a timely fashion. Pre-requisites on data quality and monitoring systems were agreed with the government, a Capacity Building Service Provider (CBSP) was brought in, and the Ministry of Water (MoW) created a Central Data Management Team (CDMT). By 2016, it was agreed that conditions allowed for PbR cycles to start, with initially 57 LGAs enrolled on the PbR scheme. This scheme was rapidly scaled up across the country, and by Phase Three, a total of 181 LGAs were enrolled in the scheme, and over the course of the PbR programme, FCDO disbursed a total of GBP 59.25 million to the government of Tanzania, over six verification cycles[9]. The current DVSP consisting of an Ecorys-led consortium is in place from Phase Three of the programme in 2018.

The PbR programme in Tanzania is innovative: it is the first WASH sector PbR effort that FCDO is implementing directly through a partner government. It is also relatively unique in using PbR to *sustain* services rather than to pay for new access.

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[8] Based on data provided by District Managers of RUWASA, which is consolidated nationally by CDMT.
[9] Although the final Phase Six cycle did not make a disbursement, as a result of global cuts to FCDO's budget.

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3. An overview of the evolution of the programme during Phases Five and Six

Over the past eight years the programme has adapted to an evolving sector context and emerging programmatic challenges and opportunities. Alongside the changes in the context, the PbR programme has evolved from inception, to maturity, and now towards an exit stage. The first and second programme-wide learning reports provide an overview of these programmatic evolutions and the changing operational context from design (2014) up to the end of Phase Four (March 2020).

Since March 2019, the programme has undergone two final PbR cycles (Phases Five and Six) and has disbursed a total of GBP 59.25 million to the Government of Tanzania over the lifetime of the programme. It was due to close at the end of March 2022 but received a no-cost extension until September 2022, in part to allow RUWASA time to utilise the funds from the Phase Five disbursement. Table 1 below provides a summary of key metrics across the programme lifetime.

Table 1: A summary of key programme statistics over time

	Phase One (2016)	Phase Two (2017)	Phase Three (2018-19)	Phase Four (2019-20)	Phase Five (2020)	Phase Six (2020-21)
No. LGAs participating in the PbR scheme	57	129	181	181	179[10]	179
No. Water Points Sampled by DVSP	5,962	40,667	51,768	18,039	2,179	9,999
Completeness of LGA reported data	Not assessed	93.2%	99.9%	Not assessed	Not assessed	Not assessed
Correctness of LGA reported data	Not assessed	67.8%	79.4%	Not checked	Not assessed	Not assessed
Mean average accuracy of reported data[11]	67%	44%	38%	40%	Not assessed	51%
Mean average functionality using hard criteria[12]	44%	24%	27%	30%	Not assessed	46%
Mean average functionality using soft criteria[13]	Not assessed	Not assessed	31%	35%	36% (weighted estimate used in payment) [14]	52%
Average amount disbursed per LGA (GBP)	£12,600	£14,100	£48,900	£97,475	£98,788	£155,815 Indicative amount due.[15]
Average amount dispersed per Region to Regional Level (GBP)	N/A	£10,900	£34,100	£67,875	£68,012	£107,273 (indicative)
Total paid to LGAs and Regions (GBP)	£0.78m	£3.09m	£9.75m	£19.41m	£19.45m	£30.68m (indicative)
Amount disbursed to higher levels in the system (GBP)[16]	£70,000	£643,000	£371,000	£1.94m	£3.89m	£6.14m (indicative)
Time between FCDO disbursement (to the Central Bank) to receipt of funds by LGAs/DMs	3 months	3.5 months	>5 months	5 months	>7 months	N/A

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[10] Two LGAs became urban authorities and hence stopped reporting data to CDMT and therefore exited the project scope.

[11] This is the accuracy of the reported data vis à vis the findings from the verification. This presents the 'pre-benchmark' figures.

[12] Definitional/methodological changes between phases makes inter-phase comparisons challenging.

[13] Definitional/methodological changes between phases makes inter-phase comparisons challenging.

[14] In Phase Five, the verification was replaced by a phone survey, which found 48% functionality, however with the challenges in accuracy of the phone-based methodology, Phase Five payment was based on weighting the phone based survey results with the Phase Four verification results.

[15] Phase Six payment calculations are solely indicative, there will be no disbursement after Phase Six due to FCDO budget cuts.

[16] In addition to the payment of LGAs, participating regions receive a payment amounting to 10% of what is being paid out to their LGAs and RUWASA receives 20% of the total amount paid out to all LGAs and regions.

In terms of cumulative totals since the programme began in 2014 up to the end of Phase Six in 2021, a total of 128,614 water points were sampled during verification (including some WPs sampled in multiple years). The total amount disbursed to the LGAs, District Managers (DMs) and Regions was GBP 52.5m and the total paid to higher levels in the system was GBP 6.9m.

A number of significant contextual changes occurred during 2020-2021, including:

- The establishment of RUWASA: As mentioned in the Phase Four report, the National Water Supply & Sanitation Act No. 5 was ratified in 2019, leading to the establishment of RUWASA, who now assume the mandate from the LGAs on rural water supply service delivery. This is expected to streamline processes and operations for government efforts in rural water supply, since government responsibilities are now within a single agency and its parent ministry, rather than cutting across several ministries. RUWASA assumed its functions on 1st July 2019, and, as with any new entity, has taken time to become fully established, staffed and operational. Significant progress has been made in this regard during 2020 and 2021, with the widespread staff recruitment[17] as well as establishment and progressive operationalisation of internal systems and processes.

- The COVID-19 outbreak: The global COVID-19 pandemic affected the PbR programme in a number of ways:

  o Verification methodology: Due to health and safety concerns, the envisaged Phase Five verification was replaced by a phone-based survey, rather than the field-based verification process of previous years and titled a 'review' rather than full verification to reflect the lower robustness of the phone-based methodology. The benefit of this was that a phone-based methodology could be tested (learning from this is presented in Section 3 of this report). Adapting the approach also helped to ensure momentum and continuity of the programme, and provided some data to be used for Phase Five payments. Phase Six verification included a field-based survey, complemented by a small sample phone-based survey.

  o Functioning of RUWASA: Despite the COVID-19 pandemic, RUWASA continued to provide services, albeit with some operational challenges and delays.[18]

- The reduction of FCDO budgets: Due to the reduction of the FCDO budget, FCDO was not able to make the final Phase Six payment. However, the Phase Six verification still occurred, as this forms an essential mechanism to appraise the programme's effectiveness and the impact of the payments from earlier phases.

- The commencement of the PforR programme: The World Bank-supported USD 350 million (International Development Association credit) Payment for Results (PforR) rural WASH programme commenced in 2019. This programme has many common elements of the FCDO-funded PbR programme, yet also with key differences in its scope, methodology and metrics for payment[19]. The first annual verification was undertaken by the PforR external verification service provider (PEM Consult) in August 2020. The World Bank issued an advance payment of USD 70 million at the beginning of the programme in September 2019. As of November 2021, in addition to the advance payment, the programme had disbursed USD 181 million and covered 17 of Tanzania's 26 mainland regions. Discussions were underway for USD 150m to be added to the programme in 2022. The size and scope of the PforR programme had implications on the PbR programme in various ways, as discussed in sections 4.1, 4.2, 4.4 and 4.7 of this report.

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[17] Many of the former LGA District Water Engineers were absorbed into RUWASA as District or Regional Managers.

[18] RUWASA reportedly experienced a relative slowing of the pace of the implementation of some planned activities, especially mobilization of communities, and procurement of construction materials.

[19] The PforR programme has a larger number of 'Disbursement Linked Indicators' (DLIs), covering functionality and also other metrics related to CBWSO performance, in addition to payments for sanitation, and WASH in schools. The PbR counterpart is primarily RUWASA, whilst the PforR counterpart is primarily the Ministry of Water.

- The establishment of the Rural Service Delivery Management System: A management information system for RUWASA called the Rural Service Delivery Management System (RSDMS) was established within RUWASA in June 2021. It is being institutionalised and expanded in phases. The first phase involves establishing a web-based platform and is expected to be completed in June 2022.[20] The next phase will include the feature of mobile-to-web reporting from the community-based water supply service providers, such as Community Management Organisations (CMOs) and Community-Based Water Supply Organisation (CBWSOs), directly into the RSDMS database, which will replace the current system of community-based water supply service providers reporting to DMs, who then enter the data into RUWASA's database.

It was agreed that the Phase Six field-based verification should maintain the same methodologies, questions, and definitions as that of Phase Four verification, to enable inter-year trend analysis. Minor updates were made to some verification questions and response sets to reflect the data fields used in the RSDMS but this affected mainly static indicators and not the indicators related to the functionality of water points. The sampling for Phase Six included an overlap with water points sampled in Phases Three and Four to facilitate the longitudinal analysis work by DIME.

In Phase Five, due to the COVID-19 pandemic, there was a shift to phone-based methodology with a reduced scope of questions and modified functionality definitions (described in detail in Section 4.3.2 below and the Phase Five Report).

Whilst still paying GBP 300 per functional water point per year and continuing to separate the payment calculation between functionality and accuracy as modified since Phase Four, the basis for payment against the results has changed in Phase Five. In Phase Five, with the simplification of the functionality status categories, there were no payments for 'locked verifiable' or 'outage verifiable' (where in Phases Four and Six these would receive GBP 150). Because of the limitations in methodologies and sample size for the Phase Five phone-based method, the payments for Phase Five were heavily weighted on the Phase Four results in terms of functionality.[21] Because accuracy could not be reliably appraised, the accuracy payment component for Phase Five used the Phase Four accuracy results. Whilst no payment was made for Phase Six due to FCDO budget cuts, the indicative payments that would have been made were calculated, and broadly used the same formula as for Phase Four.[22]

4. Key learnings arising from the programme from this learning cycle

This section of the report presents the key learning points that were identified during this third and final programme-wide learning cycle in 2021. It covers not only learning that is specific to Phases Five and Six, but also reflections of interviewees on learning accumulated over the lifetime of the programme, and learnings relating to the overall close out and exit strategy of a programme of this nature.

As with previous learning cycles, learnings are loosely grouped within six broad, interconnecting themes. However, as this is the final learning cycle, two additional themes have been added, both on the topic of programme exit strategy, as seen in Figure 3 below. These also capture reflections of interviewees to the question '*if you were to design a programme like this again, knowing what you now know, what would you change?*'.

| 1. Design and management of the programme | 2. Using PbR to stimulate change in the system | 3. Monitoring systems, and verification of results | 4. Eligibility, incentives, disbursements and fund usage | 5. Achieving outcomes (improved sustainability) | 6. Equity and Value for Money (VfM) | 7. Exit strategy | 8. If you were to design this again? |

*Figure 3: Key learning themes of this report*

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[20] Phase one of the RSDMS roll-out involved launching the technical services module, quality assurance module, assets module and service delivery module.

[21] 85% weighting for Phase 4 verification results, 15% weighting for Phase Five verification results).

[22] With the exception of the change to the 'accuracy benchmark', described later in this report.

4.1. Design and management of the programme

4.1.1. Internal and external communication, coordination and governance[23]:

- <u>Effective and customised communication helps to increase effectiveness</u>: Efforts for sub-national dissemination of verification results can increase ownership, trust and impact of the verification on planning and decision making. Providing results that are specific to each individual LGA, in a format that is easy to understand, in addition to providing a forum where results can be explained, and questions asked (e.g. by DMs and RMs - Regional Managers), can be very valuable in improving programme effectiveness and impact.[24] For example, in Phases Three to Six, DVSP developed from the verification results an 'Atlas of Results' that includes one-page summaries of verification findings for each LGA and region participating in the PbR scheme. DVSP also presented the Phase Four verification findings at a DM dissemination event organised by RUWASA in Morogoro in March 2020.

- <u>Strong intra-programme coordination and governance helps to maximise effectiveness</u>: Where a programme has multiple service providers and stakeholders, efficiency and effectiveness can be maximised by strong and frequent coordination and communication processes. Interviewees stated structures such as a programme steering committee could help in this regard. Close coordination between service providers can increase synergies and complementarities between their activities, as shown for example in the co-design between DVSP and DIME of the Phase Six verification sampling approach, to maximise the benefits of the verification for the research and evaluation work by DIME. With multiple service providers, it is also important to clearly define roles and address ambiguities or gaps, for example clarify who has the responsibility for analysing non-payment related verification data, or to communicate verification results and programme learning beyond to regional and local levels. It is also important to define any potential interdependencies between the work of the service providers, for example the interdependency between CBSP building capacity of CDMT and developing the overall database, and then the work of the DVSP that used the database data and also provided verified data that needed to be incorporated into the CDMT database.

- <u>Sector harmonisation reinforces programme effectiveness</u>: Within a programme seeking to influence, incentivise and use leverage to increase the government focus on a particular issue (in this case, on sustainability of existing schemes rather than construction of new ones), it is important that other initiatives in the sector help to reinforce this focus. Poor sector coordination can risk undermining the leverage of any individual programme. Some interviewees reflected that an effective Sector-Wide Approach to planning (SWAp) with strong coordination and mutual accountability between sector financiers and government[25] (such as a steering committee) would be beneficial. Others noted that possible co-financing could help the alignment and reinforcement of messaging to maximise impacts of a programme such as this. Where there are multiple programmes, it can be useful to have the same government focal persons working across the programmes, potentially in addition to steering committees that cover these multiple programmes.

4.1.2. Risk and adaptive management:

- <u>There are numerous funder risks for PbR programmes</u>: Whilst results-based payments transfer much of the risk to those delivering the results, there remain risks to programme funders, such as uncertainties of disbursement amounts, pressures to disburse, risks that budgets are cut,[26] and risks regarding the validity of the reported results.

> **Box 1: Understanding disbursement pressures**
>
> There are numerous factors that influence the 'political economy' of pressures and incentives to disburse funds. From points mentioned by interviewees, these include but are not limited to: Wanting to encourage and not dishearten the payee, wanting to ensure funds get into the WASH

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[23] Some learning points related to this theme that have been highlighted by stakeholders are somewhat common to many large development programs working through government.

[24] It was also mentioned in the PforR programme that the initial investment in considerable sub-national workshops with DMs and RMs during the inception of the programme helped increase understanding of the objectives and requirements of the programme, and increased their understanding and plans as to how to achieve these programme objectives.

[25] The WSDP II final evaluation report recognised that there has been a shift from a SWAp to projectized approaches.

[26] Albeit that this can also happen with a non-PbR programme.

system for improving services, wanting to keep a positive relationship (even comparative advantage) with government (who are also the payee), and internal performance indicators of funders' project managers around disbursement (both on accuracy to forecast, and total volume disbursed). Given that a key learning point from the 2014-2019 programme-wide learning report was how leverage was achieved by avoiding such pressures to disburse, and the risks of 'softening' criteria to enable payments, it is important to understand such disbursement pressures.

- There are various ways to manage funder pressures and risks: Interviewed stakeholders mentioned a number of potential ways to manage such risks, such as: using multiple payment indicators to distribute risk of poor performance across a range of indicators (including some interim process payment indicators together with output indicators); designing the programme to have a mix of input and output funding; undertaking as much prior research as possible at the outset of the programme to inform the baseline and what targets may be realistically achievable; applying adaptive management approaches (see point below); ensuring clear senior management understanding and backing for the programme; and having a multi-donor funding approach, which could help distribute risk of possible donor budget cuts and enable donors to collaborate together to manage pressures or risks between them.

- Adaptive management is key in a pioneering programme such as this: Any programme aiming to achieve an outcome - such as improved sustainability at scale - for which there is limited documented evidence as to how to achieve it, will by its nature be somewhat experimental. Whilst some aspects could potentially be researched prior to programme commencement, some elements may need to be 'learned by doing'. Output-based payments and adaptive management features of a programme help provide the 'space' for such iterative learning and adaptation. A key learning from this programme is that within the programme design, mixing output-based funding with more predictable 'input' funding, and careful design of appraisal indicators, can help further enable the 'space' for adaptation, increasing the ability to adapt. Clear processes and feedback loops of programme Monitoring, Evaluation and Learning (MEL), and periodic annual reviews, have helped to provide the evidence and opportunity for such adaptation. One interviewee also mentioned the potential importance of undertaking periodic reviews of the Theory of Change as the programme evolves, to ensure that logical or appropriate actions are undertaken.

- But there are also risks of adaptive management, which can be mitigated to an extent through up-front research, and effective communication: In a large and complex programme, iterative changes can lead to confusion or mis-interpretation as to their justification, if they are not effectively and widely communicated both among programme stakeholders and to external audiences. Iterations may increase complexity of a programme[27], or may risk reducing its credibility or the 'strength' of the incentive. For example, one interviewee mentioned a perceived 'softening' of payment indicators in the programme. One interviewee also highlighted how there is also a risk of adaptations being perceived as "*excuses for not doing the homework*" at the start of the programme.

4.1.3. Programme evaluation and learning:

- The timing of MEL activities needs to consider the utilisation rate of the payments: There needs to be an adequate period between the final programme payment and the appraisal of the final results that have been achieved from that payment. For example, the government payee's utilisation of the results payment may not fully align with government financial year, due to absorption capacity or late receipt of funds or slow internal disbursement processes. Where annual payments and verifications are made, there needs to be recognition of the 'time lag' of absorbing the last payment, and observation of changes. For this reason, FCDO is not undertaking the Programme Completion Review until mid 2022.

- Various considerations can maximise the impact of MEL activities: Understanding the most appropriate and impactful means to disseminate programme learnings is key if it is expected to lead

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[27] Although there are also examples in the programme where iterations made the programme less complex, such as removing the different payments for new and existing water points.

to improved understanding and consensus for action and adaptation. For example, in this programme, much of the findings from the evaluation and learning work of the programme were concentrated into a presentation of all results and learnings accumulated across the year into dense annual reports or workshops. Some interviewees reflected that this may risk overloading stakeholders with information, in comparison to using multiple dissemination opportunities. The interviewees further stated that having learning dissemination both 'on target' (in terms of to the right people and appropriately packaged and customised to the audience) and also 'on time' (in terms of occurring when stakeholders may be interested in or discussing a particular topic) is key. Whilst it may not be realistic to always be responsive to planning learning events in an opportunistic manner (and budgets for learning and dissemination will be finite), having learning points reinforced and repeated on an ongoing basis in regular sector forums (such as in a programme steering committee) could be a useful addition to periodic dissemination events. Finally, some interviewees reflected on how the learning and evaluation activities of the programme had focussed dissemination primarily on stakeholders directly involved in the programme, with potential missed opportunities to benefit the wider sector, both within Tanzania and globally.

4.2. Using PbR to stimulate change in the system

4.2.1. Drivers of systemic change:

- Data and verification can be potential vehicles of change: PbR's need for reliable data to prove results, and the verification process, can provide the opportunity for strengthened monitoring and data quality. The verification process checks data accuracy, and payment formula rewards accurate data (and functionality). The following examples of how verification processes can strengthen monitoring arose in this programme:
  - o The inventory approach to verification sampling, which was used by DVSP in Phases Three, Four and Six, can help strengthen and expand a nationwide water point asset inventory.
  - o The verification process can lead to a detailed review and sharpening of indicators and means of measurement on a particular topic (in this case, on 'functionality').
  - o Verification surveys can collect data on a wider range of aspects beyond only payment-related indicators (in this case, wider questions on why water points were non-functional were collected), which can be used for sector analysis and policy adaptation.
  - o Verification data can also be used to highlight issues in sector monitoring processes and data quality and for corrective action.
  - o Finally, improved data on an LGAs performance can increase accountability and recognition of good and poor performance.

- But efforts are needed to maximise the potential impact of verification and data on systemic change: It cannot be assumed that the potentials of data and verification processes for positive change, described above, will materialise without specific and sustained efforts. For example, as observed in this programme: follow-up may be needed with government counterparts to ensure verification data is actually incorporated back into government datasets for their refinement. Support is needed to ensure the database of the government can effectively manage the updated data, and that such a database is set up and working as early in the programme as possible.[28] Improvements of monitoring processes and data accuracy need to be effectively incentivised until they reach an acceptable level (see Section 4.3.3). Support and capacity building may be needed to ensure data is analysed and translated to *information*, which can be used at different levels for management decision making and policy development.

- The funds of a PbR programme can be used for leverage to strengthen monitoring systems and data. Verification can highlight data accuracy issues, which need to be acted on: Considerable leverage can be made for positive improvements to monitoring systems and data quality, for example by placing minimal thresholds for reporting and data quality for triggering PbR payments and setting eligibility requirements for district entry into the PbR scheme. Beyond this initial leverage, the design

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[28] Whilst some work was done on this issue initially through the work of the CBSP, the RSDMS was only operationalised towards the end of the PbR programme.

of annual payments can be oriented to incentivise progressive improvements in monitoring systems and data quality. This can be done, for example, through applying minimal thresholds on data quality to allow payments or by payment weighting factors that reward good data accuracy. Incentives for improving accuracy of data need to be significant enough to drive attention, commitment and action (see below, and Section 4.3.3). An important consideration in measuring the 'accuracy' of government reported data, as found in this programme, is to ensure the methodology, definitions, and means of measurement used for the verification directly correlate with that of the government monitoring and reporting system. Where poor accuracy results can be attributed to differences in methodology or definitions between the monitoring data and verification data (for example, differences in functionality classifications), this can lead to the significance of dataset discrepancies (e.g. the significance of findings relating to low government data accuracy) being excused or downplayed. It can also lead to ambiguities as to which dataset (e.g. verification or government reported data) provides the final 'true' picture of the context. Figure 4 shows that the difference between government reported data and verified data on average functionality rates has remained similar since Phase Three. Numerous interviewees reflected that while there had been some focus and incremental improvements made relating to findings on low data accuracy, more efforts could have been made in reviewing issues of data accuracy rapidly and responding more quickly.


Figure 4: Contrasting the average accuracy between government reported data on functionality, and functionality rates found through field verification. Source: developed from data in Ecorys (2021) Phase Six Verification Report.

- <u>PbR funds, payments, and leverage can be important drivers of change</u>: One interviewee stated that *"we cannot prove PbR improves functionality, but lays the foundations for systems change"*, and that *"PbR should be seen not just as a reward, but a lever"*. In the early stages of a programme, when the budget is not yet drawn down, there are major opportunities for leverage, through actions such as setting pre-requisites and eligibility criteria for the scheme to start, using the promise of funding to garner institutional and political interest in the objectives of the programme, and stimulating dialogue as to what may need to be achieved to deliver the results and unlock payments. This is key in a context where the political economy in the water sector is skewed towards new water point construction, rather than sustaining existing infrastructure. Incentivising a focus on sustaining services requires careful consideration of how - and indeed if - the programme pays for new versus ongoing water supply access. Further considerations include coordination with other programmes and sector investments which may be paying for new infrastructure, to see how this can avoid undermining incentivisation of a focus on sustainability[29].

- <u>However, leverage can be threatened by pressures to disburse</u>: For payments to be an effective lever of change, the threat of withholding payment (for example if a result or threshold for payment is not achieved), needs to be credible and rigidly adhered to. Any perceived or actual 'softening' of the indicators (described by one interviewee as "*devaluing the criteria*"), or interpretation of the payee that payments will be made even if pre-defined targets are not fully met, may undermine the potential leverage of the programme. With most sector financing institutions, there are internal pressures to disburse funds, which can pose a potential challenge to maintaining strict non-payment measures in the event of poor performance or missed thresholds. There can also potentially be other important political economy factors influencing pressures to disburse, as detailed in Box 1. As detailed in the

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[29] One idea arising in this learning process was that payments for new infrastructure are contingent on achieving a minimal district or sector-wide average functionality rate of the existing schemes.

first programme-wide learning report, this programme was able to impart significant leverage in the early years of the programme to stimulate progress in government reporting processes.

- Accountability, recognition and motivation are also important drivers of change. Planning for predictable funding is a locally important motivator: One important driver of progress and positive change can be the increased focus on performance assessment of each district (and their respective District and Regional Managers) across the country. Processes that benchmark and rank the performance of districts and regions against each other can increase accountability on the performance of individuals and teams, and allow for highlighting and follow-up on poor performance and recognition and reward for good performance. Many interviewees mentioned that such recognition and the potential for promotions and public praise were important motivators in delivering results. Although it was also mentioned that districts facing insurmountable challenges may feel 'named and shamed' for something beyond their control. Another key motivator, particularly mentioned by DMs, was the knowledge that plans they developed would be possible to finance thanks to PbR funds. Predictability of the amounts of funds to be received at the local level was key to ensuring plans could be developed based on the funds to be received, to avoid disappointment and demotivation of DMs or developing plans that are not fully funded.

- It is important to commend progress, whilst maintaining focus on persistent issues. Disbursement amounts are a high-profile metric of success, and need to closely reflect progress made in the programme : Linked with the political economy to disburse, there may also be tendencies in programmes such as this to place a strong focus on communicating on and widely praising incremental progress in results, even whilst overall results may still highlight slow or poor performance in certain areas.[30] The choice of indicators used by different stakeholders to understand and appraise progress is at the heart of this tendency. In this programme, many government stakeholders understood and appraised progress primarily based on the amount of funds that were disbursed, not necessarily focussing as much attention on the absolute levels of functionality or accuracy, nor fully understanding the somewhat complex basis on how the disbursement amounts were calculated. Indeed, many sector financing entities consider the disbursement rate of a programme as a key indicator of performance. As such, any change to payment formulas that may have a significant impact on the total amounts disbursed, which may not actually reflect performance improvements, needs to be very carefully thought through and explained to avoid misinterpretation. For example, the average payment amounts made to LGAs doubled between Phase Three and Four from GBP 48,900 to GBP 97,400, whilst average functionality and accuracy rates appeared to have minimal gains. This marked increase in payment amount was largely driven by the change in payment formula, which modified how accuracy was accounted for (shifting from a weighting factor to a small additional payment). An 'accuracy benchmark' was also applied, which was relatively complex to understand by stakeholders (if they were aware at all) and resulted in a slight increase in scores of accuracy. As such, key learning points from this programme are that adequate explanations of the payment formulae are key, payment formulae need to reflect actual progress as closely as possible, and finally, careful and consistent, sustained communication on the results needs to balance recognition and praise for progress, with a strong focus on where gaps and issues remain. Figure 5 below shows the contrasting verification results on accuracy, functionality and amount disbursed to LGAs.

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[30] For example, increases in verified functionality increased from 27% in Phase Three, to 30% in Phase Four, to 46% in Phase Six. Whilst this is indeed an upwards trajectory, the absolute percentage (<50%) of functionality shows it is still a major problem.

Figure 5: Contrasting key metrics of the PbR programme (developed from data in the Phase Six Verification Report). Please note the limitations of comparing functionality and accuracy trends for Phases One-Three, due to differing definitions.

4.2.2. Defining the route or destination of the systems change:

- <u>Programming for flexibility is key to manage the unknown</u>: At the time of design of this programme, the way to achieve an increased focus on functionality by government, and increasing functionality rates at scale, had very limited evidence to draw on from different interventions. As such, a focus on paying for outputs rather than defined inputs, coupled with adaptive management approach, was used to take a flexible 'learning by doing' approach to achieve the desired outcomes.

- <u>Defining process milestones, and mixing output and input payments, can support the process of change, but can also potentially prescribe the journey</u>: Including interim process milestones on which payments can be disbursed, for example 'new guideline developed' or '5,000 CBWSOs registered', can help to reduce funding risk, and demonstrate progress, particularly in the short-term when significant progress on output and outcome indicators are worked towards. Similarly, other programmes (such as the PforR programme) include a wider set of indicators and sub-indicators, which also require progress to be made on other aspects deemed to be important to achieve improved sustainability.[31] However, a theoretical challenge with process indicators and a range of sub-indicators stating wider sustainability 'ingredients' needing to be in place, is that it may risk being prescriptive or directive to the payee as to the steps needed to achieve the payable output/outcome result. It also implies that there is a strong evidence basis that such process indicators and sub-indicators are the most appropriate and effective means to achieve the outputs and outcomes. Additionally, it may be that the payee, in this case government, would benefit from technical assistance to help it to define or undertake some of the actions needed to achieve the payable results, and potentially to bring experiences and learning that may not be available in-country to the host government. Some interviewees mentioned the potential benefit of combining some input-based support (such as capacity building technical assistance) to help lay the foundational 'building blocks' to enable smooth delivery of the programme, and help the government to attain the results, as was done both in the PbR and PforR programmes.

4.2.3. Delivering PbR through government, for systems change:

- <u>Delivering through government can facilitate scaling but takes time:</u> This was FCDO's first WASH results-based programme funded and delivered through a partner government, rather than through non-governmental organisations or UN Agencies such as UNICEF. Interviewees noted the potential that implementing directly through government, with the mandate to ensure sustainable WASH services, may bring nationwide impact and scale. Others also remarked the myriad of challenges in working through government systems, with a key learning point being that change takes time.

- <u>It is important to understand the compatibility between Public Financial Management (PFM) norms, and a flexible approach to achieve PbR outputs and outcomes:</u> The theory of results-based funding includes the expectation that paying for outputs means those responsible to achieve the results have flexibility to innovate and decide as to the best way to achieve those results. This can be challenged somewhat when delivering PbR within government systems, by norms of Public Financial

Management (PFM), and annual planning, budgeting and reporting cycles[32]. In the context of this programme, following RUWASA's concerns that the LGAs or DMs would misuse or not spend the funds effectively, RUWASA issued guidance specifying the relative percentages of the funds that were to be used for which type of costed activity (including mandating 75% of the funds for infrastructure costs). RUWASA also required DMs and RMs to develop plans for the fund use, which were to be reviewed and approved by RUWASA's head office. RUWASA issuing such directives on fund usage implies there was a clear understanding and evidence base on the most effective means to achieve results, which may not have been the case at the time.

- <u>PbR can help align incentives within government, and orientate institutions to deliver results efficiently, although it could also incentivise government to 'do' rather than 'enable' activities:</u> Having multiple recipients of results payments[33], each receiving a proportional payment linked to progress made at the district level (for example by the DMs), can help to align incentives and foster a spirit of collaboration across levels and entities of government, to achieve the results. This was observed in the programme for example before the establishment of RUWASA, when the Ministry of Water needed to collaborate with the organisation overseeing local government (the President's Office, Regional Administration and Local Government Tanzania) to achieve results. Whilst the payee is likely to try to orientate their activities and processes in such a way as to maximise results, there could potentially be a risk that the incentive for efficiency of delivery of the results, and in-house control over the ability to achieve the results, is an overall driver of decision making. For example, it could incentivise central government entities to become a 'doer' rather than 'enabler' of results[34] or encourage a potential 'recentralisation' process if local governments are not deemed to be in a position to deliver the results as efficiently as a part of a central technical ministry [35]. In this, the impact of who would be paid for result delivery, and whether it would incentivise them to deepen or reduce decentralisation efforts, should be carefully considered during programme design.

- <u>There can be risks to the durability of systems change and sector focus over time</u>: No system is static, and there is no guarantee that a positive systemic change will necessarily be sustained over time. In a context such as this for the PbR programme, where a programme is aiming to shift government focus and commitment from new construction to sustaining existing services, such mindset change is vulnerable to personnel turnover within government and also to shifting political priorities. For example, changes to policy or practice such as ensuring that operations and maintenance is funded and considered in the performance structure of DMs remains vulnerable. Where the focus and actions have been enabled by the payments from a time-limited programme, there is also the risk that these will not continue once the funds end. There are also risks that other sector programmes may detract government from the focus on sustainability (for example through higher value results-based payments for new infrastructure construction). Programmes that seek to stimulate a permanent shift in the system should define what risks there are to achieving this shift, both within the programme timeframe and into the future, and seek to put in place means to mitigate such risks. Interviewees mentioned various ideas of how this could theoretically be achieved, including: setting pre-requisites and milestones on issues like the establishment of a dedicated government budget line for ongoing major maintenance and CBWSO support and enshrining such actions and commitments within policies and government commitments, being means to defend against future priority changes, at least in the short-term.

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[31] Such as gender representation on the CBWSO management committee, financial operating margins of the CBWSO, and a contract being in place by the CBWSO for operations and maintenance support.
[32] Although output performance can also be achieved using alternative funds from that of PbR.
[33] Such as different Ministries and/or different 'levels' of government, from local, regional and national.
[34] For example, interviewees mentioned how RUWASA had established centralised spare part supply chains, rather than reinforcing private sector-led decentralised supply chains.
[35] The 2020 WSDP II Final Evaluation highlighted some concerns around the extent that RUWASA engages with local governments and the District Water & Sanitation Teams.

4.3. Monitoring systems, and verification of results

4.3.1. Enablers and challenges to external verification:

- Various elements can be key enablers of verification, and sequencing of such elements is important: Processes for verification can be significantly enabled by having a clear reference dataset and straightforward means of identifying the correct water point from the dataset. For example, by having:
  - o a robust and comprehensive nationwide water point asset inventory;
  - o a clear and effective means to continuously update this asset inventory;
  - o a nationwide coding system that assigns each individual water point a unique identification number, which is entered into the inventory and also physically marked on the water points;
  - o having a photo of the water point stored within the inventory database.

It could be argued that it may be challenging to achieve all of this prior to the start of a programme such as this (see Section 4.8.1). However, having these steps established as soon as possible as part of the programme will enable efficient verification of reported results. An inventory approach to verification field sampling (i.e. exhaustively sampling all water points in selected communities) sampling large numbers of water points can help to develop and expand such an asset inventory. However, for such a costly approach to really add value, the government data and monitoring system ideally needs to be established and ready to be able to incorporate and effectively manage this data (which was not the case in early phases of this programme) and the data itself needs to be incorporated into the government dataset in a timely manner.[36] Another key enabler experienced in this programme was the cooperation of the government at decentralised levels to help enable the field visits of the enumerators, such as supporting route planning and pre-notifying village-level stakeholders of the visit.[37]

- Verification of functionality is complex, and it is important that the definitions and means of measurement between reported and verified data are harmonised: As mentioned in Section 4.2.1, the alignment of definitions (e.g. on 'functionality') and means of measurement between the government monitoring and reporting system, and that of the external verification, is key to minimise any reasons for discrepancies in datasets. However, operationalising this in practice can be a complex issue, depending on the methodologies of collecting the two sets of data. For example, the verification in the PbR programme was based on field-based verification of pre-identified water points (and/or all water points in the pre-selected villages), and the functionality status was taken as observed at the time of the enumerator's visit. As such, to reflect the differences in context between districts, categories such as 'locked' or 'water outage' were added, for when it was not possible to determine functionality at the time of visit based on the flow rate or handpump stroke test, because of temporary water rationing or not being able to physically access or operate the water point. Where government monitoring systems are not based on a spot-check methodology, it may not be necessary for them to include and capture categories such as 'locked' or 'outage'. This may lead to discrepancies in reported versus verified results.[38] Additionally, as highlighted in the 2014-2019 Programme-wide Learning Report, defining functionality is challenging, can risk subjectivity, and may be differently classified between community-based reporters (who may not always be familiar with definitions of classifications of functionality), and visiting external verifiers.

4.3.2. Learnings from phone-based verification:

- Verification methodologies need to be resilient to times of limited field access: Field-based verification methodologies can be vulnerable to changes in field access. This could be for example due to civil unrest, natural disasters, or in this case, disease outbreaks (the COVID-19 pandemic). Whilst delaying verification could be an option, it could risk the continuity of the programme, and the ability to continue the annual payment processes. Interviewees reflected that for programmes such as this, risks to field access ideally need to be anticipated in programme design, and where needed, flexibility built within verification service provider contracts. Verification methodologies can be

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[36] The large sample size inventory approach to verification sampling was done before the RSDMS was in place, and the verification dataset was not incorporated into the CDMT over numerous verification cycles before the RSDMS was in place..

[37] The involvement of higher levels of government, in this case, the CDMT of RUWASA, also helps to increase the understanding and ownership of government of the results, and the credibility and trust of the verification.

[38] It may be that this issue is more pronounced in the context of an exhaustive inventory approach to verification sampling, as otherwise enumerators finding locked or water outage examples could discount that water point and move to another.

adapted to cope with limited field access, although there may be trade-offs with reliability and credibility of the results (see below).

Box 2: A brief overview of the phone-based methodology applied in Phase Five

The phone-based methodology applied in Phase Five involved the survey team calling pre-identified community-based stakeholders, such as CMOs, Hamlet Chairpersons and teachers, and asking them to visit the identified water point. Whilst on-site, they were asked a short set of questions on the functionality status (whether water was flowing and if so, the strength of flow), whether there is a hardware problem, and what is the technology type.[39] A minimum of two separate stakeholders were called to triangulate results, and where there were discrepancies between the two, a third stakeholder was called. In Phase Five, a total of 2,179 water points were sampled. In Phase Six, alongside the field-based verification, a comparison of field-based and phone-based methodology was conducted on a sample of 122 water points to draw out additional lessons about the reliability of the phone-based survey.

- <u>Certain elements can considerably facilitate the phone-based approach</u>: Somewhat predictably, phone-based verification relies on having correct and updated contact details of community-based stakeholders. Where these are not held by government as was the case in Phase Five, the phone survey can provide a good impetus to update such records. It was found that pre-warning stakeholders that they would be receiving a call helped increase their willingness to engage in the process, and their likelihood of answering their phones to an unknown caller.[40] Knowing that the phone respondent is visiting the same water point to that being sampled by the interviewer, can be a challenge: interviewees from the verification team mentioned that having a unique water point coding that is written physically on the water point would have helped in this regard, and having photos of the water points saved within the asset inventory did help in this identification process, would help in this regard. Having phone network coverage over the area to be surveyed is of course both a key enabler to phone-based surveys, but also a risk to bias of sampling.

- <u>However, there can be numerous challenges in phone-based approaches</u>: Reaching respondents by phone and following up with them at an agreed time when they would visit the water point can be very time consuming. Interviewees mentioned that having clear protocols for interviewers as to the number of follow-up calls required before moving to the next identified stakeholder contact was key to remove subjectivity and to ensure a consistent approach. Some community stakeholders can be reluctant to spend time visiting the sites, and the water points in one village can be located several miles apart, resulting in time and financial costs for the survey respondents. Providing a small travel allowance reportedly helped increase cooperation, and the proliferation of mobile money in the country enabled rapid and straightforward transfer of this allowance payment. The reliability of the responses from different respondents was reported to be variable, potentially influenced by a number of factors. For example, some interviewees remarked that representatives of the CMOs and CBWSOs (water committees in the communities) sometimes (although this was from anecdotal experience rather than specific analysis) provided the least reliable data, with interviewees hypothesising an array of reasons for this, such as: concerns that reporting the water point that they are supposed to be managing (and may be receiving revenue for) being non-functional may lead to negative repercussions; or that RUWASA may want to hear the water point is working. There was also reluctance of some CMO/CBWSO staff to physically visit sites, as they mentioned they were already aware of the current functionality status.

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[39] Note – the survey and questions per water point were significantly reduced from the field based survey to the phone based survey, to ensure the calls were short. Also, the definitions of functionality status were simplified (removing Abandoned, Additional Found, and Water Outage categories, Locked was used for the purposes of skipping), and unlike the field verification, the means of measurement/definition of 'functionality' was observational, not based on flow rate or stroke tests, because the respondents were not trained in conducting the flow rate/stroke test and the variety of respondents would have made it problematic to conduct it consistently across the sample.

[40] Although, as with field verification, the more pre-warning of stakeholders, the more theoretical risk there is for gaming – although no evidence was specifically seen of this.

> **Box 3: Findings on the reliability of the phone-based approach**
>
> Undertaking remote data collection during times of field-based access limitations can help avoid delays or loss of momentum of an annual payment and verification-based programme, and provide some rationale for payment. However, in this case, the methodology did not result in highly accurate findings, with the Phase Six result comparison between phone-based and field-based verification showing the phone-based survey provided accurate results in only 60% of cases. Government interviewees had relatively low confidence in the phone survey results relative to those from field surveys, which is important given stakeholder trust in the credibility of the verification results can be key in effective verification, and to reinforce stakeholder confidence that the verification will accurately reflect their efforts for which they are rewarded. The expected reduced reliability of the results was the reason why the sample size for the Phase Five phone survey was kept to a minimum size. The DVSP recommendation was that if RUWASA wishes to use phone-based surveys for monitoring, they should be complemented by field-based spot checks and verifications.

4.3.3. Data accuracy:

- <u>Efforts to incentivise data accuracy need to be adequate and sustained</u>: There needs to be clear and effective means to incentivise improvements in government monitoring systems. In this programme, the relative importance of data accuracy in the payment formula has been modified over time, shifting from a pre-requisite for eligibility, to being a weighting factor on the functionality payment, to being a relatively small additional payment to functionality results. Having accuracy as a weighting factor in the payment formula presented challenges, because, some stakeholders explained, it detracted the focus from the programme's overall goal of improved functionality, and in contexts where functionality was high, the payments could still remain low due to poor data accuracy. It was also suggested that having accuracy as a weighting factor may have made the payment formula more difficult to understand than if renumeration for functionality and accuracy were separate. However, if using an additional payment arrangement (rather than weighting factor) to incentivise strengthening in monitoring improvements, it presumably needs to be significant enough to garner commitment. For example, since Phase Four, the maximum payment for data accuracy to an LGA was GBP 10,000, with any LGA achieving anything over 61% accuracy receiving this full amount, whilst those reaching 49-60% received GBP 7,500. Given the average LGA payment in Phase Four was GBP 97,400, the difference between achieving 49% accuracy, or anything above 61% accuracy (a difference of only GBP 2,500 in accuracy payment), represented just 3% of the total payment that LGAs would receive from their functionality and accuracy payments. With the tendency of some stakeholders to judge performance based on the total payment amount disbursed, rather than specific scores (such as on accuracy), this can pose a risk. One interviewee remarked "*the issue of accuracy – it's like they put it aside*". One interviewee reflected that where strengthening monitoring systems is one desired outcome of a programme, setting minimal targets in terms of accuracy that the programme aims to reach over its lifetime, and maintaining effective pressure and incentives to achieve this until it is reached, could be useful.

- <u>Technology can be an enabler for accurate data, but not necessarily a silver bullet</u>: There can be a risk stakeholders equate solutions to poor data accuracy with the introduction of new technologies, such as the roll out of the RSDMS or mobile-to-web reporting processes. For example, many interviewees were optimistic that the reporting and data accuracy issues observed in the PbR programme would largely be addressed by the mobile-to-web process and RSDMS, whilst Section 4.3.2 of this report highlights wider potential root-cause issues of poor data accuracy and reporting that may not be addressed by technology alone. Indeed, some elements may be enabled by the introduction of software and technology, and issues such as incentives to report may not be fully addressed by the technology alone. One interviewee also mentioned the potential value of exposing government to various effective approaches being implemented in neighbouring countries, as a way

to understand how technologies can work in context, and learn lessons from elsewhere, such as the Rural WASH Information Management System (RWIMS) system in Zimbabwe.[41]

4.4. Eligibility, incentives, disbursements, and fund usage

4.4.1. Incentives and payment structure:

- <u>The incentive and payment structure needs to be straightforward to understand</u>: As mentioned in Section 4.2.1, the basis of payment needs to be clear and well communicated, with any weighting factors clearly explained. As noted in past PbR learning reports, there can be a trade-off between a payment formula that fairly reflects the wide differences in field realities and the need to maintain a simple and understandable formula.

- <u>The payment formula can incentivise actions in different ways, which may be appropriate at different stages of the programme</u>: Theoretically, there are different tools at one's disposal in the payment formula, to incentivise a focus on a specific issue (for example, on data accuracy). Applying weighting factors in the formula may be one avenue (as applied in Phases One to Three, albeit with some shortcomings), another may be separating payments for specific results (e.g. separating payments for functionality, and for accuracy, as applied in Phases Four to Six), and another may be to set pre-requisites or minimal thresholds required (for example, >X% accuracy), before any other payments are made on other results (for example for functionality). There are likely trade-offs between each, and it may be that these different approaches may be relevant at different stages of maturity of a PbR programme, or as particular results show progressive improvements.

- <u>Careful communication of results is key and helps facilitate performance ranking</u>: This programme found that in-person workshops with DMs, together with tailored district-by-district 'Atlases of Results', helped stakeholders understand and engage with the data and findings of the verifications. As mentioned, there may be a tendency for the fund recipients to focus on the total amount to be received (rather than the detail of individual results). Hence, a key learning point from this programme is to have a payment structure that reflects progress as closely as possible (with no potential distortions such as applying 'accuracy benchmarks'), and unpacking district-by-district results for each criteria can be key. Visual representations of results between districts, such as colour-coded maps showing which functionality or accuracy rates that each district achieved (see Figure 6), have been powerful tools

Figure 6: Accuracy results per LGA. Source: Phase Six verification report (Ecorys 2021)

to help benchmark LGAs and regions. However, care needs to be taken to commend progress, whilst showing that much remains to be done.[42] Other means, such as ranking every district by performance of each result (e.g. from 1st to 179th district) may also be useful in stimulating healthy competition between districts. Indeed, inter-district and inter-regional competition and recognition of achievements was seen as one of the key non-financial drivers of change and motivation factors by the DMs and RMs.

4.4.2. Disbursement, conveyance, and absorption:

- <u>It is important to understand absorption capacities</u>: In contexts where multiple programmes or funding conduits are channelling funds to particular recipients (in this case, RUWASA and the DMs), the rate of supply of funds may exceed the absorption capacity of the recipients to utilise the funds

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[41] Information on the Rural WASH Information Management System can be found here:
https://repository.lboro.ac.uk/articles/conference_contribution/Strengthening_WASH_sector_monitoring_through_the_use_of_ICTs_experiences_from_Zimbabwe_s_rural_WASH_information_management_system_RWIMS_/9589133
https://www.herald.co.zw/how-zims-rural-water-information-system-got-global-applause/
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=WLJonmBdmSQ
[42] For example, in some verification reports, the map colour coding for data accuracy had one single category for all results >51% (rather than disaggregating these), and colour coding this category was marked green, suggesting >51% is 'good'.

within the financial year. In such cases, funds may be held, for example by treasury, until past payments have been fully absorbed. In this respect, interviewees remarked how coordination between programmes as to amounts disbursed and understanding the potential absorption capacity of the recipients is key, as is the potential flexibility of payments to be used between financial years. Other interviewees mentioned the importance of the recipient government coordinating between programmes, to manage disbursements of funds to LGAs.

4.4.3. Fund usage:

- Facilitating district strategic planning processes could help make annual planning and fund usage more strategic and accountable: Annual payments require planning to be developed on how to utilise such funds. However, annual planning without an overarching multi-year strategic plan that shows the 'end goal' (for example 90% functionality, or universal access across districts), risks being disjointed and lacking prioritisation and sequencing of investments across more than one financial year to achieve such strategic outcomes. Some interviewees felt that having clear district strategic plans, setting out what was needed to achieve and sustain universal access in the district, would have been very valuable to have in place early in the programme and to inform subsequent decision making.[43] One interviewee also remarked that having a district plan that all stakeholders agree with and follow, would also help hold RUWASA accountable for the usage of funds within the district.

> **Box 4: Factors influencing decisions on fund usage**
>
> Factors influencing decisions on fund usage: A myriad of factors can influence the decisions on what the payment recipients spend money on. In this case, factors influencing the usage of the funds included:
>
> - the timeframes available to utilise the funds, which is linked with delays in conveyance of funds through the PFM cycle, and when funds were received within the financial year;
>
> - guidelines from RUWASA headquarters as to what funds could be used for; on the payable result itself (in this case, 'functionality') and any additional guidance provided by line managers (e.g. from RMs);
>
> - the content of local government plans.

- Payments at higher 'levels of the system', can facilitate district-level results, and support internal auditing costs: Interviewees mentioned that having clear institutional guidelines on how funds should be spent at the district level, and clear, centrally approved district annual plans, helps to facilitate the auditability of fund usage. However, having these in place, as was the requirement of RUWASA in this programme, could theoretically also reduce potential 'space' for local-level innovation and discretion on how to use the funds to maximise the results. Payments at higher levels of the system have allowed funds to be available for government to undertake actions that can facilitate district-level progress, for example strengthening nationwide monitoring systems, or developing evidence-based guidelines. They have also allowed funds to be available for centralised internal auditing entities to audit how funds are used, hence potentially decreasing donor risk. Finally, one interviewee mentioned how the availability of funds at the central and regional levels may have helped unblock implementation challenges at the LGA level in some cases.

4.5. Achieving outcomes (improved sustainability)

4.5.1. Setting the goals:

- 'Functionality' does not equal sustainability, and it focusses more on infrastructure than services: Identifying a metric (or set of metrics) to adequately define and measure 'sustainability' of rural water supply services can be challenging. Functionality has historically been used in the sector as a proxy for sustainability. However, functionality is just one, albeit important, feature of a sustainable

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[43] Whilst the PbR programme did include the existence of a District WASH plan as a pre-requisite for entry of an LGA into the scheme, previous learning reports have described how the quality of plans was not a factor, nor technical assistance provided to help to develop strong strategic plans.

rural water supply service. Functionality is an infrastructure-focussed proxy indicator for sustainability, and the means of measurement is often through periodic surveys. There is a potential that such an infrastructure-focussed indicator, may encourage an infrastructure-focussed response (fixing a broken water point), rather than necessarily incentivising wider actions to be taken to address the root-causes of why the water points were non-functional in the first place. The global thinking around sustainability of water supply services and metrics that can be applied to measure sustainability has evolved considerably since the design of this programme in 2014. For example, there is a shift in sector language from average functionality rates, to *service continuity* (e.g. the percentage of the time the water supply provides adequate volumes of water). It could be considered that functionality itself is an 'output' or 'process' related indicator, to a wider outcome indicator around water supply service adequacy and reliability.[44] However, it is also recognised that at the time of designing the PbR programme, it was important to shift focus from new construction to maintaining existing schemes, and that aiming initially on 'functionality' may have been a relevant first step towards working on more advanced service performance indicators. This is discussed further in section 4.7.1.

4.5.2. Defining pathways to achieve goals:

- <u>Defining sustainability barriers from the outset can be key, and it is important to consult those closest to the issues in such a diagnostics process</u>: Defining the root causes behind low functionality rates is important to inform what is needed to address these, and different stakeholders may have different perspectives as to what may be drivers of or pre-requisites for sustainability. Whilst some valuable work on better understanding sustainability challenges was undertaken by DIME[45], one interviewee remarked how a comprehensive sustainability diagnostics should be undertaken early in the design or delivery of programmes such as these. Additionally, verification field surveys hold the potential to collect data on the reasons for low functionality, for example through adding survey questions on this, as was done by DVSP in Phases Four and Six. In a context where centralised entities are developing guidance or strategies to improve sustainability, efforts to ensure a 'bottom-up' process in defining issues and actions to address them can help to ensure centralised guidance is grounded in the understanding and experience of sub-national actors, and that solutions are not imposed from the 'top-down'. For example, the DM survey conducted by DIME, and the sub-national interviews and focus group discussions in this learning process highlighted some of the priorities that the DMs would have in addressing sustainability issues[46], which were not necessarily included as eligible cost activities within the centrally-defined RUWASA guidelines on how the PbR funds should be used.

- <u>Different water supply service delivery models may emerge over the course of the programme, which may be useful to identify and test as alternative routes to achieve results</u>: Flexibility is important in the design of this type of results-based payment programme to allow for new approaches and ideas that may emerge from (global) sector thinking and innovation over the duration of the programme. Adaptive management can help in this regard, as can – as is the case of the PforR programme – the inclusion of research and pilot studies to run alongside and inform the wider results-based programme[47]. For example, the PbR programme was designed at a time that the prevailing service delivery model for rural water supply in Tanzania was that of community-based management, supported by local government.[48] Designing programmes in such a way as to enable the innovation or application of a variety of service delivery models (such as performance-based maintenance service delivery models, for example), can further provide the space and flexibility to evolve to achieve the overall desired outcomes.

4.5.3. Payments reinforcing foundations for sustainability:

- <u>It is important to understand roles and responsibilities for achieving sustainability outcomes, and reinforce these through who is paid, for what</u>: A key decision at programme design phase in results-

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[44] The increasing awareness within RUWASA around 'service delivery' rather than infrastructural 'projects', provides an enabling context to evolve to service delivery outcome-related monitoring and payments.

[45] Such as the 2018 CMO survey, the Maji Endelevu design work, and the DM surveys.

[46] Such as providing the CBWOSOs and CMOs with technical training.

[47] This was also the case in PbR, where DIME had a complimentary intervention of Maji Endelevu.

[48] This rural water supply model was also noted in the Water Act 2019.

based financing is who to pay and for what end purpose. A clear understanding of different stakeholder groups' mandates to achieve the payable results is important. For example, in many contexts, including in Tanzania, responsibility for ongoing maintenance is shared between the service providers (e.g. CMOs, CBWSOs), the local government or government water supply Ministry or Agency. The relative boundaries of responsibilities are often poorly defined, such as the responsibility for 'minor' and 'major' maintenance tasks, and respective responsibilities for their financing. DIME's Maji Endelevu complimentary intervention sought in part to increase the understanding between stakeholders' roles and responsibilities in maintenance. Overall, when considering who to pay for functionality outcomes, it is important to define who should be paid, and how to ensure that payment to them positively reinforces clarity in role definitions and does not risk creating further ambiguity.[49] National and sub-national interviews identified that in some cases, the PbR funds may have also been used also for minor maintenance costs,[50] although there was no specific information collected as to exact examples.

- Undertaking a demand-responsive approach can be important for sustainability but challenging in a programme such as this: Sub-national interviewees highlighted the importance of local stakeholder consultation and 'community ownership' as important foundations for sustainability. Some interviewees also stated how there was often limited time to utilise funds before the end of the financial year. Theoretically, the short timeframes to utilise funding may not always incentivise or enable work of the DMs to be very engaging and consultative with the communities, where in some cases guidance on the use of funds may have encouraged a 'supply driven', primarily infrastructural response.[51] One interviewee mentioned however that where there is predictability of the funding to be received at the LGA level, then community consultations can be done prior to receiving the funds, and once the funds are received, then they can focus on infrastructural works.

4.6. Equity and Value for Money (VfM)

It is beyond the scope of the programme-wide learning cycles to undertake an analysis that would allow valued judgement as to the extent the programme achieved VfM or equity of outcomes. Listed below are simply learning points that have arisen relating to VfM and equity on programmes such as this.

4.6.1. Defining the payment value, appraising VfM:

- Defining 'how much money is enough?', is a challenging question, as yet without a clear answer: A key driver of VfM for a results-based programme, is that the amount paid is enough to enable and incentivise delivery of results, without paying more than is necessary. Determining the optimal amount to pay and also the total programme budget size, can be a challenge. For example, how much is enough to achieve stakeholder interest and behaviour change, and incentivise a focus on ongoing maintenance rather than new construction? It may be that this amount would also be influenced by the relative availability of other sector funding and programmes at any particular time, for example for new construction. It may also be that the amount of funds needed may not remain constant throughout the programme – for example, once stakeholder interest and commitment is achieved, could subsequent payments be reduced to be limited to just those deemed necessary to achieve the results? Could the externally provided payments be reduced proportionately through time as government 'matching payments' proportionately phase in? Determining the appropriate budget and payment amount will also depend on the overall objectives of the programme. For example, it could be possible to undertake life cycle cost analysis and cross-country cost benchmarking for sustaining rural water supply services but determining such benchmarks for less tangible but significant objectives, such as mindset and systemic change, can be more challenging

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[49] Some DMs reflected that it was not always clear the distinction of responsibilities between RUWASA and the service providers in terms of maintenance, including in how funds were to be used. Guidance on this has since been developed.

[50] Respondents reported that funds were received with guidelines on how funds should be used. For example, a certain percentage is for auditing, or supervision, however, were also spend in accordance with action plans and prioritization according to demands. The references to minor repairs included acknowledgements that COWSOs were responsible and in some cases purchased the spares.

[51] In DM surveys of DIME, and DM interviews as part of this learning cycle, DMs highlighted the importance of training and follow-up of community based service providers, to improve sustainability.

to appropriately price. These various issues were highlighted by interviewees, but no clear consensus on how to determine 'how much is enough' was reached and would make an interesting topic of future learning and research, in this programme, or in the sector more broadly.

- **The ability to undertake cost-effectiveness analysis is influenced by the programme design**: Determining cost effectiveness will depend to an extent on the availability and comparability of other initiatives that can be benchmarked against the programme, both in terms of cost and performance. There can be a challenge of clearly defining attribution versus contribution in terms of output-based payments being the specific reason for an observed increase in results, particularly if a programme covers nearly every district of the country, as this programme does.[52] To improve the ability to determine cost-effectiveness, verification methodologies and definitions need to remain consistent across the programme period (or at least certain core indicators), to allow for annual trend analyses.

4.6.2. Enablers and risks to VfM:

- **There are numerous enablers of VfM for a programme such as this**: Factors that could potentially help to maximise the prospects of VfM which were mentioned by interviewees included: effective coordination and maximised synergies between different service providers within the programme; coordination, harmonisation and mutual reinforcement between the programme and other sector funding initiatives; maximising the value of learning and evaluation activities and findings in course correction of the programme and informing wider sector activities; maximising the enabling context for the utilisation of the funds (e.g. minimising any risks of delays of fund receipt); ensuring data generated in the programme is utilised to the maximum value; and sequencing activities so as to ensure foundations are laid to lever maximum benefit from subsequent activities.[53] The interviewees also noted that not all these elements were in place in the programme.

4.6.3. Achieving equity outcomes:

- **Achieving equity may need to be specifically incentivised, and deliberately monitored**: It cannot be assumed that outcomes and outputs will be equitable if they these are not specifically incentivised, or if equity is not specifically monitored.[54] Theoretically, having a fixed payment to achieve a result will incentivise focussing on the most cost-efficient to achieve this result, meaning a theoretical lower prioritisation for those communities or schemes that are likely to be most costly to reach or support. However, no specific evidence was found of this.

- **PbR rewards the best performers, but additional consideration may be needed as to how improve the progress of the poor performers**: By definition, results-based approaches rewards those who perform well. Whilst theoretically useful for incentivising progress, it may have implications as to the equity targeting of payments, or equality of payments between districts, particularly when over multiple years the well-performing LGAs continue to receive more funds than poorly performing LGAs. One interviewee described the risk of "*helping the good get better, while keeping the weak, weaken*".[55] In this case, RUWASA's response to geographical disparities in payments between LGAs was to use other sources of funding to 'level up' fund allocations between districts. Whilst this can help to increase equity of fund distribution, and also help to address issues such as broader water resource constraints that affect the DM's ability to attain functionality results, it may theoretically risk undermining the payment incentive.

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[52] Project implementation did not allow a causal impact evaluation which could help attribute outcome changes to PbR. Experimental impact evaluation was not possible because it was a nearly nation-wide programme and there would not be a control group, non-experimental impact evaluation was not possible because data and assumptions could not be met. That is the reason why FCDO, GoT and DIME designed the Performance Evaluation as a theory-based performance evaluation with the objective to review possible bottlenecks along the project's theory of change. This helps identify improvements on a continuous basis, and ultimately maximise PbR's odds of having impact.

[53] For example, having a unique water point ID coding system and monitoring and database software established and rolled-out prior to large scale inventory-approaches to verification surveys.

[54] The program was initially designed with equity targeting, but this was amended for reasons summarised in the 2014-2019 Programme-wide Learning Report.

[55] Indeed, findings from DIME analyses found on average, poorly performing LGAs received less than half the amount per water point than payments to the high performing LGAs (DIME DM Survey presentation, 2021).

4.7. Exit Strategy

4.7.1. Designing with the end in mind, and appraising annually:

- <u>It can be useful to place the programme within a longer-term sector trajectory, in defining how the programme would be institutionalised:</u> Defining a longer-term goal or desired state of a sector in the future, can help situate a time-bound programme such as this on a spectrum of sector development. The temporary results-based payments system can be seen within a clear trajectory towards a desired system state and long-term goal.[56] Doing so could help to define targets and interim milestones the programme seeks to achieve, and what programme funding or activities could be transitioned to in future. Whilst it may be challenging to define such long-term trajectories from the outset, doing so early on and annually appraising them, could help

Figure 7: An example trajectory of 'raising the bar' for service level targets

establish milestones for a transition, institutionalisation and exit strategy, and allow monitoring progress towards it. Figure 7 shows an example trajectory of 'raising the bar' for service level targets.

- <u>There can be risks of substitution or displacement by the programme, which need to be identified and understood</u> Results-based funding is often used in the WASH sector to increase access, for example in an expansion of infrastructure and services, rather than to sustain ongoing services. Where external payments are being used to finance a recurrent cost (for example, recurrent maintenance of water supply schemes, in this case), it is important that such funds do not displace funds that would have otherwise been allocated to such costs, and to define what post-project sources of revenues these costs could be transitioned to. Numerous interviewees, in addition to the WSDP II final evaluation, raised concerns about the long-term continuity of government-allocated funding after the PbR or PforR programmes finish, although some interviewees also reflected that programs aimed to stimulate positive systemic change may not need to be continued, once the change (such as increased awareness and commitment on sustainability) has been achieved. Theoretically, having milestones for progressive transition[57] could help avoid a potential 'cliff edge' at the end of a programme.

- <u>A common vision is needed across programme stakeholders for the programme exit strategy, and clarity as to who needs to work on what to achieve this:</u> Dialogue about the objectives as to what the programme should achieve before exiting, how a transition could work, and what is needed to be done to work towards this transition, would be a valuable discussion across programme stakeholders (and the wider sector) from an early stage. It is important that different service providers and stakeholders have a clear common vision of the transition, and clearly defined roles as to their part in the transition. Such a transition plan should be reviewed periodically, and work towards an exit strategy should not be seen as an action left for the end of the programme. Some interviewed stakeholders mentioned how discussions on the programme exit could have been held earlier in the programme.

4.7.2. Defining what to continue, where to anchor this, and how:

- <u>It is important to unpack the elements of the programme that should continue and develop specific strategies for each:</u> A programme such as this has a number of features and benefits, which need to be unpacked to determine which would be beneficial to continue after the programme ends. In the context of the PbR programme, this could include elements such as: ongoing financial allocation to costs of maintaining and sustaining rural water supply services; appraisal and quality assurance of

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[56] For example: how could time-bound functionality results payments transition in the long-term to a recurring subsidy for rural water supply services; how the payments can help to establish viable performance-financed service delivery models and service providers; how external verifications and strong MEL systems could enable the incoming of a rural water supply service regulator, etc.

[57] For example a proportional decrease in annual programme funds to an annual increase from other publicly-sourced funds.

government-reported progress and monitoring datasets; processes of reporting results and recognising and appraising performance against results; ongoing periodic reflections and evidence-based dialogue on how to improve sub-sectoral sustainability. One interviewee reflected that once these different elements were unpacked for a programme such as this, specific exit and transition strategies (and milestone indicators) could be developed for each one, in consultation with stakeholders.

- In the transition from external verification, it is important to anchor the strong elements within future programmes, or recurrent processes of the sector: In contexts where other programmes in the sector will continue to undertake results-based payments and verification, a transition could focus on defining the 'good practice' elements and ongoing efforts of the outgoing verification service provider's work and aiming to have these adopted and continued by the successor programme[58]. In other contexts, where there is no continuity of external or internal results-based payments, the concept of continuing 'external verification of results' may be less relevant. In such circumstances, it may be useful to consider where to 'anchor' actions and objectives of verification, within permanent institutional structures, and also recurrent processes and requirements, of different government institutions. For example, shifting the focus (and language) from 'verification' of data to 'internal quality assurance' processes of monitoring and reported data, and potentially also anchoring elements of verification within government auditing functions.[59] Whilst it is important to involve government counterparts to build capacity for potential continuity of actions after the departure of an external verifier, it should not be assumed that a counterpart is necessarily a successor to undertake the functions of the external verifier. This is particularly the case if those counterparts are within the payee organisation, and therefore are unlikely to be deemed 'external' or objective. Building the capacity of government to be able to undertake external verifications in the future may be useful, and one reflection from the programme is that it is important to consider whether skills are needed for government to *undertake* verifications in future, and/or skills to *commission and oversee* effective, externally contracted verifications. In this programme, there was an assumption that government would continue to undertake verifications in future, and therefore there was a focus on what low-cost 'good enough' methodologies for verification could be applied (for example, phone-based surveys were trialled). However, there may be a trade-off between cost and reliability (and therefore perceived value) of the methodology (as mentioned in Section 4.3.2).

4.8. If you were to design this programme again?

As this was the final programme-wide learning cycle, undertaken towards the end of an eight-year programme, interviewees were asked the question *'if you were to design a programme like this again, knowing what you now know, what would you change?'*. Responses were not specific to this particular programme, or indeed specific to Tanzania, but rather more general suggestions to those seeking to undertake a similar programme (e.g. using results-based funding for increasing rural water supply sustainability) in Tanzania or elsewhere.

4.8.1. Chicken or Egg: Putting things in place ready for PbR, vs needing PbR to put them in place

- Undertaking initial research is key, but some things are hard to anticipate or know from the outset. There is evidence on 'what' needs to be done in systems change in WASH, but not on 'how', which may need to be learned by doing: Many interviewees listed elements that would ideally need to be known before starting such a programme (listed below). However, some interviewees also reflected that at the time of the design of this programme, it was "*difficult to know what you don't know*", and that it would have been challenging to have really anticipated all elements or researched all factors in advance, rather than the need to learn by doing. A common consensus of interviewees was the need to try to anticipate and research as much as possible from the outset – and that future initiatives can learn from this programme – and to build in the flexibility to adapt from the outset. Interviewees mentioned that generating the information and understanding ideally needed from the outset, could

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[58] Interviewees recommended encouraging the PforR programme to take on the style of results reporting of the PbR verification.

[59] Interestingly, the PforR programme runs the verifications through a service provider contracted and overseen by the Tanzanian Government's Internal Auditor General.

theoretically be achieved through undertaking studies before designing the programme, undertaking a smaller-scale 'pilot phase' to lay foundations for a larger programme, or including such elements within a kind of extended inception phase.

- It is hard to galvanise commitment to put programme 'pre-requisites' in place without the potential reward of programme funding, but it is equally hard to have a programme without these pre-requisites: Some interviewees reflected that there can be a *"chicken or egg situation"* in terms of some of the actions that ideally would be put in place from the outset, for the programme to work. For example, putting in place a strong government monitoring system and improving the quality of data, would require the interest and commitment of the government to do this, which may be hard to achieve, without the programme having been designed and launched, and all the potential leverage and attention that the potential of unlocking funds can bring.

4.8.2. Elements to try to understand or put in place before or early in a programme:

Notwithstanding the 'chicken or egg' issues noted above, the following features were highlighted by interviewees that ideally would be in place before, or as early as possible in, a programme such as this:

➢ Sector monitoring systems and processes, good data, and clear definitions: Elements mentioned included: clear national rural water supply service standards, with clear indicators, definitions and means to measure them, which adequately reflect the heterogeneous contexts of rural water supply services across the country; a nationwide water point asset inventory, in which each water point has a unique identification code, which is also written physically on the water points; a clear process for routine collection of the service delivery data, a database and monitoring software that can handle such data, and processes and capacities for internal data quality assurance.

➢ Understanding sustainability determinants and stakeholder roles: A clear, unbiased and highly consultative assessment of barriers to sustainable rural water supply service delivery, including an understanding of factors that may vary spatially[60]; clearly defined and widely understood roles and responsibilities of different stakeholder groups on sustaining rural water service delivery (for example, defined roles for financing minor and major maintenance), and associated guidance for tariff setting.

➢ Strategic plans, and long-term vision: A long-term vision for rural water supply service delivery (including targets, at least for the 5-year government strategic planning cycle), defined through widespread sector consultation, and therefore an understanding of how a temporary funding of sustainability-focussed results[61] could help contribute towards this vision, and what it would transition to at the end of the programme; multi-year strategic and costed plans developed at district level aiming to achieve and sustain universal access with a strong information base and stakeholder consultation, on which to guide (and be accountable for) annual plans and expenditures of payments; platforms for multi-stakeholder planning and review at the district and national level.

➢ Understanding PFM processes and decision-making factors: A clear understanding of the processes and potential timescales for channelling funds through government systems and understanding of the factors that can affect decision making on the usage of the funds.

4.8.3. Design elements and considerations:

Below are features mentioned by interviewees that could be useful to include in programme design.

➢ Defining leverage, and factors that may undermine it: The programme design should define not only what it wants to change and influence, but also the various levers that the programme and its financier may have control over to stimulate such change. Factors that may undermine such leverage, for example pressures to disburse, or crowding-in of funding, should be identified as risk factors, and mitigations included accordingly.

➢ Adaptive management, research, learning, technical assistance and pilots: Invest in robust upfront studies and baselines, aiming to determine realistically achievable targets, whilst including the

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[60] This can help define contextual factors that may hinder some district's ability to attain results, such as wider water resource constraints, and which may need additional considerations as to how to address.
[61] Potentially seeking to evolve from functionality results to service continuity and quality results.

'space' within the programme management and its performance appraisal to innovate, learn by doing, pilot approaches, and be flexible as to how to reach programme goals. Include ongoing research, evaluation and learning processes (with fast feedback loops) to provide an evidence base for adaptations, and regular multi-stakeholder platforms and processes to discuss and formalise adaptations. Consider including a component to enable the government to access flexible, timely and high quality technical assistance, to help bring in new ideas, and support the government to undertake wider actions needed to achieve the results.

➢ Communication and coordination: Ensure roles and responsibilities between programme service providers are clearly defined between them, any mutual reliance between them is identified, and mechanisms are in place to maximise coordination and synergies between them. Use programme and sector steering committees to 'anchor' the programme in the sector, and ensure harmonisation with other sector initiatives. Ensure strong, sustained, multi-level communication with programme stakeholders, to ensure everyone is clear on the programme aims, how to achieve results, and understand where progress is (or is not) being made.

➢ Incentives and monitoring on equity, accountability, VfM and impact: Consider how the programme would incentivise and track equity and VfM. Where possible, undertake a life cycle cost analysis to understand potential costs of sustaining service delivery, and collate benchmarks of achieving sustainable service outcomes through various service delivery models. Where necessary, include additional programme features to ensure the programme can identify and reach those most in need, potentially including the role of civil society in equity targeting, and in programme accountability.

5. Recommendations

At the time of writing this learning report, there were around three months remaining (although this was then extended until mid 2022) in the programme, at which point the external verification team (DVSP) were focussing on their exit activities, the external evaluation team (DIME) were undertaking their final year's evaluation and learning activities, FCDO was supporting the closure of the programme and transition of activities to other initiatives in the sector, RUWASA continued to evolve its efforts towards increasing and sustaining rural water supply services, and as the World Bank's PforR programme continued and was considering a follow-up programme with an increase in budget.

The recommendations below and in Annex 1 are tailored to this context, and are grouped by stakeholder, whilst recognising there may be overlaps in the responsibilities of undertaking these between these stakeholders. Recommendations for DIME and DVSP are presented in Annex 1.

FCDO:

1. Continue to facilitate the transition of certain elements of the programme between PbR and PforR programmes (and other sector investments): Unpack the elements of the PbR programme that have been effective (identified in Section 4.7.2), and work with PbR stakeholders and the wider sector to define how such elements could continue beyond the programme duration. Particularly, work with the incoming PforR counterparts in the World Bank, to share insights and learning from the PbR programme, and to encourage continuity of efforts and activities between the two programmes.

2. Maximise the sharing of learning from the PbR programme, within Tanzania and globally: As per Section 4.1.2, invest in the collation, distillation and dissemination of learning and research findings from this programme, ensuring such learning is disseminated more widely, for example across WASH sector actors in Tanzania, within FCDO globally, and to the wider global WASH sector. Where relevant, enable programme service providers to feed into this wider dissemination process.

RUWASA, MoW, World Bank, and other sector financiers:

1. <u>Continue to strengthen monitoring systems, and appraisal of their contents</u>: As mentioned in Section 4.3.3, ongoing efforts are needed to strengthen data accuracy and monitoring more broadly:

    a. Continue to clean the dataset within the RSDMS, removing non-existent water points, and define a clear sector-wide process for adding new water points to it;

    b. Accelerate the roll-out of the physical marking of water points with their unique number ID;

    c. Analyse whether the assumptions that the RSDMS and mobile-to-web data entry systems actually improve data accuracy,[62] and where challenges persist, put priority and funds to understand and address remaining issues;

    d. Share with the DVSP RUWASA's plans for monitoring, and work with DVSP to review and strengthen the internal protocols for the process for data collection[63], and also of quality assurance (QA) of monitoring data, strengthen decentralised capacities in RUWASA to undertake this QA, and ringfence future budgets for it; strengthen arrangements for internal accountability and sanctions for reporting and transmitting inaccurate data.

2. <u>Whilst commending what is working well, don't lose sight of what is not</u>: Considering findings in Section 4.2.1, ensure that the appraisal and communication of performance of a programme (or of RUWASA generally) is not overly based on the total amounts disbursed and absorbed, but on the individual results that are achieved. Whilst commending good performance, ensure adequate focus is placed on issues that may not be making major progress, such as functionality of rural water supply services, and data accuracy.

3. <u>Continue to reinforce the prioritisation of sustaining services over new construction</u>: Significant efforts have been made in this programme to shift the political economy and government focus from new construction to improved sustainability outcomes, however, the durability of this change may be fragile (See Section 4.2.3). Incoming sector investment in Tanzania should seek to ensure this continuity of focus and reinforce this overarching message.

4. <u>Ensure widespread clarity on roles and responsibilities for maintenance and reinforce these</u>: As per Section 4.5.3 clearly define roles and responsibilities for the construction and ongoing service delivery and sustainability of services between service providers and RUWASA, and ensure such clarity or guidance is widely disseminated. Ensure any subsequent actions, such as RUWASA spending in maintaining water supply schemes, reinforces this clarity in roles and responsibilities.

5. <u>Strengthen capacities for data analysis and usage and share the data</u>: As discussed in Section 4.2.1, strengthen the centralised and decentralised capacities of RUWASA to convert data to information, and information to planning and decision making. Work with DIME to 'handover' the process of ongoing data analysis and the holding of periodic review workshops to consider what can be learned from the monitoring data. Make RSDMS data available to the wider WASH sector, to maximise the value of the data, and also to benefit in the potential for other sector actors to add to and quality assure the data.

6. <u>Work with LGAs and CSOs to develop WASH plans and increase accountability</u>: As suggested in Section 4.4.3, to ensure the (significant volumes of) incoming PbR and PforR funds are used as strategically and equitably as possible, RUWASA should work with LGAs, CSOs and the wider WASH sector actors to develop strategic multi-year district WASH plans, which define the pathway to achieving and sustaining universal access to WASH services in the districts. Ensure a strong evidence base and close dialogue and engagement of local actors in

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[62] Including consideration of the findings from the DVSP phone surveys and reliability of different respondents (e.g. CBWSOs).
[63] For example, how DMs update the data in the RSDMS, who checks any changes etc.

developing these plans, use the plans to inform annual fund use, and use district annual review processes to increase the local consultation, accountability and transparency.

7. <u>Continue to test different service delivery models, and approaches for monitoring</u>: Progressively evolve sector performance indicators towards sustainable service delivery outcome indicators (see Section 4.5.1) and ensure there is a strong evidence base for any process indicators that are defined as steps towards these outcomes (Section 4.2.2). Continue to enable and test a range of service delivery models, such as performance based maintenance models (Section 4.5.2) to achieve such service level outcomes, and consider testing innovations in technologies for service monitoring.[64] Continue to scale-up the expectation and requirement in the sector that complex technologies need to be accompanied with more robust capacities and support arrangements than the currently widespread 'basic' community-based management model.

8. <u>Ensure VfM is a primary driver for programming and decision making</u>: As discussed in Sections 4.6.1 and 4.6.2, with large volumes of funding being channelled to RUWASA, it is important to ensure VfM continues to be a primary consideration and performance indicator, and track whether it incentivises and enables DMs to prioritise VfM and maximise sustainability foundations in their decisions on how to utilise the funds (see Sections 4.4.3 and 4.5.3). Undertake a Life Cycle Costs Analysis of the funds required to achieve sustained adequate levels of service delivery, obtain comparator benchmarks for achieving such outcomes, and contrast them against funds provided to government to achieve such outcomes. Ensure sector investments lead to maximising efficiency in service delivery, and strengthen long-term revenue bases (e.g. tariffs).

9. <u>Assess and incentivise efforts towards increasing equity of service delivery</u>: As per Section 4.6.3, work with DIME and others in the coming months to analyse the extent to which results-based funding is leading to equitable service delivery outcomes, and consider incentivising and monitoring the processes that can result in improved equity.

10. <u>Define the progressive exit or transition strategy for external funds for sustainability</u>: Related to Sections 4.6.2 and 4.7, define, through consultation with the wider Tanzanian WASH sector, what long-term vision and targets would be sustainable for rural water service delivery, and identify where in this process the PbR and PforR programmes will get to, and once these wind down, what will fill the financing gap in lifecycle costs that the programme funds were temporarily covering. During the PforR programme, consider maximising cost efficiency in service delivery, whilst strengthening revenue collection through tariffs, and where an ongoing performance-based, targeted subsidy to rural water supply services will continue to be needed, define where this will come from once the external financing ends.

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[64] Such as real-time monitoring smart sensors.

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Annex 1: Detailed recommendations for DIME and DVSP for the remainder of this programme

Recommendations to DVSP for the verification exit strategy

- Work with RUWASA, MoW and the External Auditor General to define their interests and needs for ongoing verification, and evolve the scope of focus (and language) from 'verifications' to 'ongoing quality assurance of monitoring data' or 'data to support auditing', to anchor the work within ongoing activities, requirements and management priorities of these institutions (whilst acknowledging that capacity building on verification is not in the scope of DVSP's remit but DVSP may be able to contribute to this as part of an additional value add);
- Work with RUWASA to review and advise on their draft protocols for internal reporting and 'verification' (quality assurance) of monitoring data (whilst acknowledging that capacity building on monitoring is not in the scope of DVSP's remit, but rather was the scope of CBSP);
- Related to the point above, whilst acknowledging limitations of DVSP's remit and available time, discuss with RUWASA and DIME, to provide RUWASA with reflections and ideas as to how they could potentially appraise the accuracy and reliability of their new RSDMS and incoming mobile-to-web processes;
- Provide RUWASA documented insights as to where the current issues in accuracy and more broadly in the reporting system may be, and suggestions as to how to improve these (in addition to the 2nd bullet point above, which focusses on RUWASA's new and upcoming monitoring and verification intentions);
- Building on discussions in the 2020 Morogoro workshop, continue to provide RUWASA guidance and reminders as to the kind of insights they could obtain from analysis of the datasets, and develop recommendations around capacity building needs in RUWASA for data analysis and data-based decision making;
- Clearly document and 'handover' details of how verifications were done, hand over databases and tools, and all produced reports to the government, and work with FCDO and the Government of Tanzania on making documents publicly available where possible;
- Collaborate with the PforR verification service provider to share learning and results communication tools, and encourage continuity of verification between PbR and PforR;
- Work with DIME on interpreting the broader analysis of verification datasets, helping nuance findings and interpretation from DVSP's significant accumulated field experience and insights.

Recommendations to DIME for the final year of evaluation and dissemination work:

- Undertake detailed analysis of the non-payment related questions from Phase Four and Six verification surveys, together with cross-phase trends analysis, to develop insights into potential sustainability determinants. Hold dialogue sessions with RUWASA and the wider WASH sector actors in Tanzania to explore and discuss these findings, and their implications;
- Consider analysing whether there is any causal link between increased accuracy and increased functionality;
- Analyse whether districts that have struggled to achieve significant improvements in results were affected by any wider contextual factors;
- Seek to further analyse the equity of fund usage and outcomes from the programme; investigate the impact of 'levelling up' funds or additional PforR funds on the effectiveness of the PbR payments to incentivise actions;
- Work with DVSP to analyse the reliability/accuracy of different respondent types from phone surveys, and maintain a dialogue with RUWASA on the implications of this for their plans for ongoing monitoring of rural water service delivery;
- Further analyse and seek to quantify the drivers for poor data accuracy, particularly relating to differences in measurement and definitions/functionality categories between verification and government monitoring data, to give further insights as to the extent of accuracy issues that

remain after such differences are discounted, and feed this back to RUWASA for their information and action;

- Try to gather qualitative or quantitative information that can provide insights as to the extent that VfM has been a driver in decision making or fund usage; try to unpack or define the attribution of observed positive progress, for example in mindsets towards sustainable service delivery, or increased functionality results, between the impact of RUWASA being established, the impact of the PforR programme, and the PbR programme;

- Work with the World Bank and RUWASA/MoW to 'handover' the multi-year trend analysis work that DIME has been doing on the PbR programme data, aiming for continuity of this into the PforR programme;

- Place considerable efforts on dissemination of knowledge and dialogue around what the evaluation findings mean for RUWASA and wider sector actions and policy.

- To the extent possible, undertake multiple events, engaging stakeholders from PforR and the wider Tanzania WASH sector, and disseminating information incrementally to maximise information absorption;

- Upload and make publicly available all the key evaluation reports, handover datasets to government and PforR for future analysis, and synthesise findings to learning briefs that are disseminated within and beyond Tanzania.

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Annex 2: List of interviewees and online workshop participants

Table A shows the list of stakeholders consulted as part of information gathering for this programme-wide learning report.

Table A: List of stakeholders consulted

Name	Position	Organisation
National & Global Level Stakeholders		
1. Alena Cierna	Project Manager	DVSP (Ecorys)
2. Aidan Coville	Economist	DIME
3. Enock Wagala	Director of Planning	RUWASA
4. Paul Deverill	Senior WASH Adviser	FCDO (UK)
5. Duncan McNicol	Global Coordinator	Uptime
6. Jens Vads	Member of PforR verification team	PEM Consult
7. Don Brown	Team Leader	DVSP (IWEL)
8. Eng. Mkama K. Bwire	Director of Water Supply & Sanitation	RUWASA
9. Harieth Kaiza	Chief Internal Auditor	RUWASA
10. Gertrude Kihunrwa	Advisor	FCDO
11. Jane Ikamba	Data collector	Datavision
12. Iain Menzies	Team Leader	World Bank
13. Aziz Mutabuzi	Manager – Technical Support Section	CDMT, RUWASA
14. Singolile Mwamwaja	Data Manager	CDMT, RUWASA
15. Jérôme Sansonetti	Economist	DIME
16. Kema Koronel	WASH Expert	DVSP (WEMA)
17. Lukas Kwezi	Senior Responsible Officer	FCDO
18. Harold Lockwood	Learning and Communications Expert	DVSP (Aguaconsult)
19. Machibya Magayane	Deputy Team Leader	DVSP (WEMA)
20. Rachel Norman	Learning and Verification Expert	DVSP (Ecorys)
21. Stefanie Henke	Survey Manager	DVSP (Datavision)
22. Stella Elia	Data Manager	DVSP (Datavision)
District & Regional Manager Phone Interviews		
23. Elikalia E Malisa	District Manager	Njombe DC Makambako TC
24. Maua J Mgallah	District Manager	Momba
25. Eng. Erasto Mgaya	District Manager	Bukoba
26. Eng. Robert Mgombela	District Manager	Bahi
27. Eng. Simon Ndiamukama	District Manager	Ngara
28. Eng. Kikiwa Remnant	District Manager	Rungwe
29. Eng. Godfrey Mbabaye	Regional Manager	Momba
30. Eng. Charles Pambe	Regional Manager	
31. Eng. Sadik Chakka	Regional Manager	
32. Eng. Hans Patric	Regional Manager	
33. Eng. Warioba Sanya	Regional Manager	
Participants of District Focus Group Discussions		
34. Anitha Anatory	WEO	Karagwe / Nyaishozi
35. Diana R. Ichwekeleza	WEO	Karagwe / Kihanga
36. Kulwa Ngassa	Katibu	Karagwe / Nyakayanja
37. Genoviva K. Laurean	Katibu	Karagwe / Kihanga
38. Pevine Onesmo	Katibu	Karagwe / Katanda
39. Erick Pantaleo	VEO	Karagwe / Ihembe
40. Danborn Kanyawawa	WEO	Karagwe / Kibondo
41. Rogius P. Pwekenya	VEO	Karagwe / Chanika
42. Edgar S. Mathias	Katibu	Karagwe / Chanika
43. Mihobzi J. Kanyginya	Katibu	Karagwe / Kibogoizi
44. Flora J. Rwehabura	KNY-DM	Karagwe / Kayanga
45. Christian Cheyo	TECH	Karagwe / Kayanga
46. Verena Mathias Kabula	Katibu	Karagwe / Nyakaiga
47. Annamaria Mtabaro	PS	Karagwe / Ofisi Ya DM RUWASA
48. Shamim Makinda	Ag.DDSHO	Karagwe / Kayanga
49. Khadija Y. Fadhili	ECHO	Karagwe / Kayanga
50. Pelesia T. Pendo	CHW	Karagwe / Nyakaiga
51. Flora J. Rwehabura	KNY DM	Karagwe / Kayanga

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	Name	Position	Organisation
52.	Beatrice Laurent	WASH.CORDIN	Karagwe / Kayanga
53.	Jacline B. Pendo	MWL/AFYA	Karagwe / Kayanga
54.	Joshua J. Kashanja	MWL/AFYA	Karagwe / Kayanga
55.	Pontian Kabulaya	EHO	Karagwe / Nyakasimbi
56.	Willson Nyandibu	MJA	Karagwe / Chanika
57.	Hapiness K. Ndyamkama	EHO	Karagwe / Nyaishozi
58.	Mwesigwa A. Masinde	MWL/AFYA	Karagwe / Bugene
59.	Sarah P Mihambo	MWL/AFYA	Karagwe / Rumanika
60.	Alexia R Katanga	MWL/AFYA	Karagwe / Kambarage
61.	Khadiry S. Motomwihaku	Katibu	Uvinza / Mganza
62.	Yona N Luyange	M/KITI	Uvinza / Mganza
63.	Coleta Maurice	M/KITI	Uvinza / Lugufu
64.	Damas Mapunda	Katibu	Uvinza / Lugufu
65.	Sprian Muroto	M/KITI	Uvinza / Kazuramimba
66.	Naswabu Zuberi	Katibu	Uvinza / Kazuramumba
67.	Hussin Sadick Baagomova	M/KITI	Uvinza / Nyanganga
68.	Yasin S. Kapata	Katibu	Uvinza / Nyanganga
69.	Andrea Z Ndandari	Katibu	Uvinza / Ilagala
70.	Mauridi Solo	M/KITI	Uvinza / Ilagala
71.	Vumilia S. Bulinjiye	P.TECH	Uvinza / RUWASA
72.	Niyikunda Nzogera	AG.DPEO	Uvinza / Uvinza
73.	George J. Bosco	DM	Uvinza / Uvinza DC
74.	Hussein Kateranya	DESO	Uvinza / Uvinza DC
75.	John M. Lumala	DCSAQO	Uvinza / Uvinza DC
76.	Jefta A. Julius	DM	Uvinza / RUWASA
77.	Kennedy I. Mangasa	TECH	Uvinza / RUWASA UVZ
78.	Ester Kundael	AG DHS	Uvinza / Uvinza DC
79.	Elizabeth M. Deya	AG. DPEO	Uvinza / Uvinza

Stakeholders were purposively selected and consideration was given to the criteria as set out below. DVSP Learning Team consulted RUWASA-CDMT on the selection of the LGAs from which DMs were interviewed and FGDs organised. RUWASA-CDMT did not have any reservations against the LGAs randomly selected in line with the criteria mentioned below.

DM/RM KII selection:

- those not surveyed as part of the DIME survey respondents;
- selection from those top-half performing and bottom-half performing

FGD selection:

- The original plan was to select one LGA from each of the following zones: Central, Lake and Southern Zones. This would allow a selection of 3 LGAs where the DMs have not been interviewed as part of the above KIIs and to have one consistently top performing, one consistently poor performing and one varied performing LGA. However, in the final selection, due to time limitations only 2 out of the 3 zones were selected: Lake Zone and Central Zone.
- Karagwe (Lake Zone) was selected as a consistently poor performer whereas Uvinza (Central Zone) was selected as a varied performer.
- The individual stakeholders were selected by contacting the DMs and asking them to convene one meeting to bring together CBWSOs/CBOs and a second meeting to convene more broader WASH sector stakeholders.